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This thesis examines the geostrategic contexts that influence China’s policy decisions to 
not recognize North Korean escapees in China as refugees. Due to China’s unwillingness 
to recognize the rights of North Korean escapees, the international community criticizes 
China for its violations of international refugee laws. However, public censure has failed 
to persuade China to reconsider its treatment of North Korean escapees. This thesis 
argues that the complicated diplomatic relationships and entangled national interests 
between China, North Korea, and other concerned countries has resulted in the Chinese 
government not recognizing North Koreans in China as refugees. The author contends 
that rather than merely condemning or taking a hardline policy against China, the other 
states that want China to comply with refugee laws should maintain a dialogue and 
pursue cooperation to solve this refugee problem. Chapter 1 defines important terms 
regarding the North Korean refugee crisis1 and provides relevant background information. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  author	  uses	  “refugee	  crisis”	  to	  refer	  to	  exodus	  of	  North	  Koreans	  to	  China.	  Although	  the	  Chinese	  
government’s	  intertwined	  diplomatic	  and	  contextual	  conflicts	  prevent	  China	  from	  recognizing	  these	  
North	  Koreans	  as	  refugees,	  the	  author	  uses	  this	  term	  because	  other	  countries	  commonly	  use	  this	  
term	  to	  describe	  similar	  situations,	  and	  the	  author	  personally	  believes	  that	  North	  Korean	  escapees	  
should	  be	  recognized	  as	  refugees.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  more	  encompassing	  and	  as	  neutral	  as	  possible,	  the	  
author	  later	  introduces	  her	  new	  term	  “North	  Korean	  Escapees	  in	  China	  (NKEC),”	  and	  uses	  it	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Chapter 2 analyzes conflicting views about this issue among key members of the 
international community such as the Statute of Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), North Korea and China. Chapter 3 illustrates 
China’s violations of international human rights laws while maintaining regional security 
and its economic benefits, despite international criticism. Chapters 4 to 6 demonstrate 
where the United States, South Korea, and China, respectively, stand on this issue in a 
geopolitical context. Along with literature from the west regarding China’s violations, 
this thesis incorporates China’s perspective based on literature from Korea and China to 
present more diverse perspectives on this matter. A new term to describe this particular 
group of North Koreans in China is proposed and used throughout this thesis: “North 
Korean Escapees in China (NKEC),” with consideration of their unique situation. This 
thesis hopes to speak on behalf of the many voiceless NKEC, and increase awareness 
among the international community of the deplorable situations that NKEC have to 
endure.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
throughout	  the	  thesis	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  North	  Korean	  escapees.	  	  Although	  the	  author	  uses	  the	  term	  
refugee	  crisis,	  instead	  of	  escapee	  crisis	  the	  thesis	  is	  still	  referring	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  NKEC.	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PREFACE 
 
After I graduated high school in South Korea, I did an internship with a NGO that 
helped refugees. I helped the asylum seekers from Congo, Liberia, Chad, Ethiopia, and 
Eretria to attain their legal refugee status. They fled their countries in fear of persecution. 
They could face public execution if they failed to get the refugee status and were 
deported to their home countries. At that time, I thought these life-threatening situations 
might only happen in Africa, without realizing that unbelievably inhumane stories were 
unfolding everyday with my brethren on the other side of the border of my country, 
Korea. Due to the separation over sixty years, most South Korean people, including me, 
became numb to North Korea’s occasional provocations and did not pay any serious 
attention to the people in North Korea. This changed dramatically for me after I first met 
a North Korean escapee.  
My initial impression from the first North Korean I ever met in my life was 
“Wow, he looks normal.” Growing up with hearing devastating stories of North Korea, I 
unconsciously had thought they would look different from us. This is how much I did not 
know about North Koreans. His story was absolutely terrifying, although I had heard 
many heartbreaking stories previously from other refugees. He had the most deplorable 
life. He lost his father by starvation when he was seven, and his mother and sister became 
victims of human trafficking in China. I felt shame about my ignorance. I was content 
with my good deeds of helping others, while many of my brethren in the north were 
agonizing from severe persecution and dying of starvation. The meeting with this North 
Korean escapee became a turning point in my life, and I changed to advocate for North 
Korean human rights.  
 Lee   
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While studying International Relations and Global Studies at UT Austin, I became 
more interested in helping voiceless refugees on a global scale. Advanced education 
through various classes, discussions with my colleagues, and meaningful instruction from 
professors have helped me to develop better knowledge of the theoretical concepts and 
complicated dynamics among countries regarding North Korean human rights issues. I 
wanted to see how far I could explore in this field based on the knowledge that I have 
obtained throughout my college years and my direct experiences with North Koreans. I 
was motivated  to develop and conduct my research by my desire to help improve the 
situation of North Korean escapees in China. I had the privilege to meet outstanding 
professors who have guided me to think and imagine in ways I had never before. I also 
interviewed a number of human rights activists who have devoted their lives to 
researching and rescuing North Koreans. While the scholars helped me to develop my 
ability to think critically and carefully, the North Korean human rights activists inspired 
my passion. The journey of thesis writing was quite challenging at times as I developed 
my knowledge of this topic, but it reinforced my passion in advocating for North Korean 
human rights.  
While conducting this yearlong thesis project, I have committed more seriously to 
addressing human rights issues. I want to be a voice of the voiceless people from North 
Korea who are oppressed and persecuted. After I graduate this year, I plan to pursue 
graduate study in this field. I would like to become a professor who teaches her students 
to learn more diverse and neutral perspectives about human rights issues not only in 
North Korea but also around the world. I want to help my students to become empathic 
with people and their needs and pains. As a scholar, I would be able to develop better 
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knowledge and policy to help these North Korean refugees, and educate the next 
generation to have more interest and compassion. My ultimate career goal is to become a 
North Korea specialist for the National Security affairs team at the White House. As an 
expert, I would like to contribute systematically to harmonizing the practical diplomatic 
interests and humanitarian needs and developing a remedy for the two Koreas, which 
have suffered from war-torn wounds for more than sixty years. I believe this thesis is a 
starting point of my lifelong journey to become someone who can contribute to 
unification of the two Koreas.   





In May of 2013, the author gathered with a group of people in front of the City 
Hall of Seoul in South Korea with a picket sign in one hand and a candle in the other. The 
sign read, “Can’t You Hear the Cries of Nine Brothers and Sisters?” The demonstration 
was held right after nine young North Korean escapees had been forcefully repatriated to 
North Korea from Laos.2 These nine young escapees were on their way to South Korea, 
their final destination, and were going through Laos as their transit country, but they were 
caught by Laotian border guards and quickly deported back to North Korea. This was the 
first time the Laos government handed over North Korean escapees to North Korea. It is 
important to note, these nine escapees, however, were not the first North Koreans to be 
repatriated. There had been countless numbers of voiceless North Korean escapees who 
had been coercively deported to North Korea.  
 This particular event drew the public’s attention because the majority of these 
nine escapees were orphans who had lost their parents due to the severe famine in North 
Korea. They ranged in age from 15 to 23, and they were protected and guided by South 
Korean Christian missionaries during this journey. The escapees, who contact South 
Koreans, especially if they are Christian groups, would be punished significantly harsher 
once they were deported to North Korea. For these reasons, if the young escapees were 
returned, they would inevitably face hard labor, imprisonment, or more likely the death 
penalty. However, the South Korean embassy’s passivity in Laos incited the South 
Korean public’s demonstrations. The South Korean embassy was expected to take a more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Jeyup S. Kwaak, “Laos Returns Refugees to North Korea,” Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2013, sec. Asia, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324682204578514772761682396.	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assertive role in rescuing these nine escapees, who are interpreted as South Korea citizens 
by its constitution, when they were caught in Laos.3  Due to the South Korean 
government’s “Quiet Diplomacy”4 however, the embassy was idle and inactive, which, in 
part, contributed to the refoulement of these nine escapees back to North Korea. 
 After receiving harsh criticism from the enraged South Korean public for its 
inadequacy, the South Korean government only then demanded that North Korea ensure 
the safety of those nine escapees. Along with South Korea, the United States strongly 
expressed its concerns about the human rights violations for these escapees, criticizing 
North Korea’s previous inhumane punishment to escapees. The United States and South 
Korea were certain that these nine young North Koreans would face public execution for 
the crime of treason. Corresponding to this international pressure, North Korea 
extraordinarily released videos of these nine escapees annually— 2013, 2014, and 
2015— to prove that they were not executed, but rather they were very content with their 
lives in North Korea.5 Featuring these children on state-run television, where they claim 
to have been tricked to leave North Korea and expressed thanks to their leader Kim Jong 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Jethro	  Mullen,	  “Outcry	  over	  Young	  North	  Korean	  Refugees	  Handed	  back	  to	  Regime	  by	  Laos	  -­‐	  
CNN.com,”	  June	  2,	  2013,	  http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/31/world/asia/laos-­‐north-­‐korea-­‐refugees/.	  
4 YongKeum	  Kim,	  “북한	 난민	 대책에	 대한	 연구	 -	 동독.	 베트남	 사례를	 중심으로	  [A	  Study	  on	  the	  
Strategy	  for	  North	  Korean	  Defectors	  with	  a	  Focus	  on	  the	  Eastern	  Germany	  and	  Vietnam’s	  Cases,	  
translated	  by	  Jane	  H.	  Lee]”	  (MS	  Thesis,	  Chungnam	  National	  University,	  2011);	  Chun-­‐Koo	  Jeong,	  “제	 7	 
장	 조선족,	 탈북자	 그리고	 한중관계	 [Korean	  Chinese	  and	  North	  Korean	  Defectors	  in	  Korea-­‐China	  
Relations,	  translated	  by	  Jane	  H.	  Lee],”	  Unification	  Strategy	  6,	  no.	  1	  (2006):	  189–214;	  Ki-­‐Hyun	  Lee,	  
“중국의	 탈북자	 정책	 동학과	 한국의	 대응전략	  [Strategic	  Approaches	  to	  China’s	  North	  Korean	  
Defector	  Policy,	  translated	  by	  Jane	  H.	  Lee],”	  Unification	  Policy	  Studies	  21,	  no.	  2	  (2012):	  119. 
5 Kwaak, “Laos Returns Refugees to North Korea”; By Paula Hancocks and KJ Kwon CNN, “North 
Korean Defectors Sent Back Agonizingly close to Freedom - CNN.com,” CNN, accessed March 14, 2016, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/30/world/asia/north-korea-laos-defectors-hancocks/index.html; “N. Korea 
Releases Video of Repatriated Young Refugees,” Mail Online, December 9, 2014, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-2866976/N-Korea-releases-video-repatriated-young-
refugees.html; Hyo-jin Kwon and Mi-jin Kang, “North Korea Releases Video of Defectors Forced to 
Return,” The Guardian, December 11, 2014, sec. World news, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/north-korea-releases-video-defectors-forced-return. 
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Un for saving them by bringing them back to their home country, North Korea has used 
these children as propaganda.6 People in South Korea and the United States were relieved 
to know that these escapees were alive, but highly skeptical about the treatments toward 
these escapees behind the scenes.  
 Although this story had a happy ending, this is only one of countless incidents of 
refoulement of North Korean escapees, and most are not as fortunate. Many refoulement 
cases are conducted covertly in China even before these escapees can reach Laos or other 
transit nations in the Southeast Asia. After this frustrating incident, the United States and 
South Korean governments strongly urged China to stop the refoulement and demanded 
them to acknowledge North Korean escapees as refugees. However, the Chinese 
government refused the request and firmly maintained its usual practices of refoulement 
of North Korean escapees when they are caught.   
 The reasons why China wholeheartedly supports North Korea are numerous and 
complicated. China wants to keep North Korea as its geostrategic buffer zone, against the 
direct influence of the United States at the border.7 China would do anything in order to 
prevent North Korea from collapsing. If it collapses, the aftermath would significantly 
threaten China’s economy, social structure, and overall security.8 A massive influx of 
North Korean escapees to China may accelerate the collapse of North Korea. North 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  CNN,	  “North	  Korean	  Defectors	  Sent	  Back	  Agonizingly	  close	  to	  Freedom	  -­‐	  CNN.com.”	  
7	  Lee,	  “중국의	 탈북자	 정책	 동학과	 한국의	 대응전략	  [Strategic	  Approaches	  to	  China’s	  North	  Korean	  
Defector	  Policy,	  translated	  by	  Jane	  H.	  Lee]”;	  Joel	  Wuthnow,	  “Warning:	  Is	  China	  Pivoting	  Back	  to	  North	  
Korea?,”	  Text,	  The	  National	  Interest,	  accessed	  April	  25,	  2016,	  
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/warning-­‐china-­‐pivoting-­‐back-­‐north-­‐korea-­‐15427.	  
8 Lee,	  “중국의	 탈북자	 정책	 동학과	 한국의	 대응전략	  [Strategic	  Approaches	  to	  China’s	  North	  
Korean	  Defector	  Policy,	  translated	  by	  Jane	  H.	  Lee]”;	  BongKu	  Lee,	  “북한	 이탈	 주민의	 국제적	 보호에	 
관한	 연구	  [A	  Study	  on	  International	  Protection	  for	  the	  North	  Korean	  Defectors,	  translated	  by	  Jane	  H.	  
Lee]”	  (PhD	  Dissertation,	  HanYang	  University,	  2011).	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Koreans do not know the objective reality of their dire situation because its government 
has been blocking outside information from them. However, people escaping from North 
Korea would witness the outside world, and learn about how prosperous capitalist and 
democratic societies are. They would spread the word to their families and friends back 
in North Korea, and this may inspire them to escape by crossing the border to China as 
well.  
Despite the long history of mass exodus of North Koreans into China, there is not 
a proper term that accurately describes the characteristics of these unprotected and fleeing 
North Korean citizens. They have generally been referred to as migrants, defectors, 
refugees or asylum seekers, but none of these terms alone can fully capture the 
complicated nature of their motivations, purposes, and circumstances for leaving their 
country and seeking shelter in China. Perhaps not having an accurate term to fully 
encompass the fleeing North Koreans in China reflects the bitter reality of them not 
belonging. Before exploring in detail the dynamic of these North Koreans’ situations in 
China, this thesis will analyze reasons why preexisting terms are not sufficient, as well as 
introduce a new descriptive term, North Korean Escapees in China (NKEC), that serves 
to capture all the unique circumstances of this particular group. The new descriptive term 
will be used throughout the thesis.  
The first term to examine is “migrants.” Migrants are people who “choose to 
move in order to improve the future prospects of themselves and their families.”9 
Migrants are not necessarily people who have to flee to secure their lives from harsh 
persecution. Rather, they are people who simply move to different locations to live a 
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better life. The purpose of their movements is closely related to economic reasons in 
general. During the early 1990s, the term “migrants” was proper for the migrating North 
Koreans, because the main reason for their movement to China was to avoid starvation 
from famine. Since the mid-1990s, however, the purpose of their movements has become 
more diverse than the economic reasons alone. North Koreans do not have freedom in 
movement for travel or relocation. Leaving the country without the state’s permission is 
punishable. Once they are out of the country without an official document, they are 
labeled as political criminals by the North Korean government, and they face a great risk 
of being persecuted. Moreover, migrants are excluded from the protection for refugees 
defined by the UNHCR, according to the 1951 Refugee Convention. For this reason, the 
term “migrants” is not accurate to describe the North Koreans who are fleeing and hiding 
in China.  
Probably the most commonly used term to describe the fleeing North Koreans in 
China is “defectors.” The definition of “defectors” is “ [people who] consciously abandon 
their home or default party [to] switch sides.”10 International community, such as the 
United Nations, commonly refers to the migrating North Koreans in China as defectors. 
In their news reports, international media generally mentions this term within the context 
of “human rights violations for North Korean defectors.”11 The majority of the 
undocumented North Koreans who cross the border to enter China are ordinary citizens 
who have no particular political conflicts or disagreements. Rather, these people expect 
their life might be better off economically in China, although entangled political reasons 
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  “Defector,”	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  accessed	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11	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  “World	  Report	  2015:	  North	  Korea	  Events	  of	  2014,”	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  
January	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  2015,	  https://www.hrw.org/world-­‐report/2015/country-­‐chapters/north-­‐korea.	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are also becoming increasingly common. The term “defector” may convey the North 
Korean government’s negative perspective by labeling these people as betrayers who 
abandon their country. However, this term does not fully account for North Koreans’ 
motivation of escape.  
The third term is “refugees.” According to the UNHCR’s definition, a refugee is a 
person who “[has] a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,” and “is outside 
the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country."12 The fundamental differences between 
“refugees” and “migrants” are spontaneity and persecution. Migrants may voluntarily 
move to seek for better lives, whereas refugees generally “have to move [in order to] save 
their lives or preserve their freedom.”13 Normally, refugees are not protected by their 
home nation, which is occasionally the main agent of persecution. In the sense that they 
are at high risk of being persecuted, the fleeing North Koreans to China are similar to 
refugees. The UNHCR evaluates refugee applicants based on their situation and if they 
have profound reasons to be recognized, the UNHCR will legally recognize them as 
refugees. However, whether or not they are accepted to the country is a different matter. 
The UNHCR does not have authority to place refugees in a country of their choice. If the 
individual country decides to accept refugees, they can freely practice their rights under 
the protection of that country. But in the case of North Koreans fleeing to China, they do 
not have the freedom to practice their rights. They desire to be recognized as refugees, 
but they do not receive such recognition. 	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According to the definition of the UNHCR, an “asylum seeker” is a person “who 
says he or she is a refugee, but whose claim has not yet been definitively evaluated.”14 
Generally, national asylum systems in the refugee-seeking nation decide which asylum-
seekers actually qualify for international protection. Those judged not to be refugees, nor 
to be in need of any other form of international protection, could be sent back to their 
home countries. Asylum seekers are not refugees yet, but are seeking protection from 
another state. In this sense, the North Koreans in China, who desperately need 
international protection but are (intentionally) not recognized as refugees yet, can be 
considered as asylum seekers. Asylum seekers are usually in the process or waiting to be 
recognized as refugees. It is not even feasible for the fleeing North Koreans in China to 
ask for international protection. Although possible in theory, they cannot request 
protection publically, because that may place them in a great danger, possible 
refoulement. For this reason, they do not seek international protection, but rather endure 
severe human rights violations, while trying to find a change to escape to other transit 
countries.  
Conceptually, it is difficult to label North Koreans fleeing from their country with 
existing terms. We might use the more neutral and broader term “escapees” to avoid any 
misunderstanding and improper labeling. “Escapees” are those who escape from their 
home country to another for whatever reason, whether it is temporarily or permanently. 
However, the term, escapees, does not clearly convey the desperate needs of legal and 
humanitarian protections for the fleeing North Koreans in China. North Koreans in need 
of international protection in China display the following conditions, according to the 
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  -­‐	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  accessed	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scholarly articles and government reports reviewed and interviews conducted by the 
author, that make them distinct from other escapees, migrants, defectors, refugees, and 
asylum seekers: 
1. Their unique circumstance is mostly bounded within China  
2. Most of them crossed the North Korea-China border after the 1990s 
3. The purpose of their escape is not only because of economic reasons, but also 
political and cultural ones 
4. Regardless of their purposes, they risk their lives to cross the border. Once they are 
caught, they are in great danger of being imprisoned, forced into hard labor, tortured, 
or executed 
5. They have great fear of refoulement 
6. The majority of them stay in China temporarily as a transit country  
7. They are in need of international protection 
8. They are not legally protected and their freedom of practicing their rights is deprived 
in China  
9. They are voiceless. Either they are not aware of what rights they have, or they choose 
not to exercise for their rights in China due to their vulnerable situations 
 
It is important to recognize that most North Koreans in this situation are voiceless. 
They cannot freely express their rights and oftentimes they do not even know about their 
own basic human rights due to North Korea’s biased education system. Even the fleeing 
North Koreans in China are entitled to universal human rights, but having those rights 
respected and practicing them freely is a completely different matter. Due to the fear of 
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refoulement, they endure deprivation of their rights, and they cannot settle in any one 
place for long.  
A myriad of Korean scholars use talbukja (A Korean word meaning people who 
escaped from North Korea) to refer North Koreans escapees. However, the English 
translation of talbukja varies with multiple implications. For example, in his English 
abstract, Ki-hyun Lee translated talbukja to North Korean defectors,15 whereas Jung-hyun 
Cho translated it to North Korean escapees.16 Talkbukja in Korean generally refers to 
North Koreans who have escaped their country, not including any other ethnicities. While 
neither of these articles went into any detailed discussion about the translation of 
talbukja, it appears that both authors use the term for a very general purpose to 
encompass all different causes and to collectively identify those people who fled North 
Korea and who are in harsh circumstances, whether it be survival from starvation, 
political dissension, or simply seeking a better life. This is rather common among Korean 
scholars and media to use both terms, defectors and escapees, interchangeably. Chinese 
scholars have also recently adopted this expression from Korean scholarship. Since the 
scholarly meaning of talbukja may lead to multiple definitions and understandings, it is 
essential to come up with a new and neutral term that is exclusively representative of 
North Korean escapees in China.  
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  Approaches	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Taking these special traits into consideration, the author proposes a new term for 
this particular group of the North Koreans in China: “North Korean Escapees in China 
(NKEC),” and this term is used throughout the remainder of the thesis.   
The number of NKEC who cross the Tumen River has constantly increased until 
recently when the new regime started in North Korea.17 Since then, the percentage has 
dropped because North Korea’s new regime strengthened border control to keep people 
from escaping.18 However, people still cross the border, risking their lives. Even if these 
people arrive safely in China, their security is not guaranteed at all. China and North 
Korea have bilateral treaties ensuring that China would unconditionally deport NKEC 
back to North Korea.19 Although China has obligations to abide by the international 
human rights laws as a member state of the Refugee Convention and Protocol,20 China 
has given a higher priority to the bilateral treaties with North Korea.21 It therefore refuses 
to treat NKEC as refugees according to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR)’s suggestions.22 Due to the lapse of observing the ordinary 
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Issues and Its Status, translated by Jane H. Lee],” Report of Korean Association for Broadcasting & 
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21	  Bilateral	  Treaties	  between	  China	  and	  North	  Korea	  are	  following:	  PRC-­‐DPRK	  Escaped	  Criminals	  
Reciprocal	  Extradition	  Treaty	  (1960),	  Frontier	  Service	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  Regulations	  for	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  Border	  
Area	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22 Kim, “중국	 내	 탈북자	 문제	 해결방안에	 대한	 연구  :	 독일과	 베트남의	 경험을	 중심으로 
[Problems and Solutions of the North Korean Asylum Seekers in China: Focusing on the Experiences of 
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international human rights laws and treaties, serious human rights crises tend to occur 
with NKEC. Placed in such a horrific and vulnerable situation, many NKEC, regardless 
of their age and gender, tend to become targets of human trafficking.23 Once they are 
caught by Chinese police and sent back to North Korea, their entire families are in great 
danger of collective punishment. Due to these seemingly intentional oversights regarding 
human rights abuses and violations of international laws and treaties, China is subject to 
harsh criticism by international community.  
It is also important to recognize, however, that China has certain reasons and its 
own justifications for interpreting international human rights in different ways than its 
allies.24 China has a particular interpretation of human rights, which is different from that 
of the West and South Korea. Historically, China has prioritized national interests over 
individual human rights, which causes international criticism. Acting in the interest of its 
sovereignty and non-intervention policy, China, however, refuses to reform its human 
rights policies. The North Korean refugee crisis clearly represents China’s difficulties in 
balancing its national interest and its responsibilities as a global leader. This thesis will 
consider why the Chinese government does not recognize NKEC as refugees. This 
research will also broaden the scope of the issue and demonstrate that this seemingly 
regional and relatively unwatched refugee crisis actually also affects several counties’ 
interests.  
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To deliver broader and more diverse observations regarding the North Korean 
refugee crisis, this thesis compares international human rights laws with international 
refugee laws. It also discusses many unconventional perspectives from South Korean 
scholars, which are not discussed as much in Western society, in addition to insights from 
Western scholars and the Chinese government. Examining various sources with different 
international perspectives demonstrates the complexity of the North Korean refugee crisis, 
and this thesis proposes such a methodology that leads to a possible solution to improve 
the problem. Attention is paid to somewhat different and rather neutral perspectives of 
Korean scholars’ research about China’s conduct.  
Since Korea and China have shared a similar cultural background over their long 
history, Korean scholars have a unique and keen understanding of China’s complex 
perspective. For example, Ki-hyun Lee, researcher of Korean Institute for National 
Unification, offers readers a broad scope of contextual background about China’s 
politics, economics and diplomacy to help understand and interpret China’s non-
cooperative behavior. Lee does not necessarily support China’s stand on its human 
rights policy, but he objectively demonstrates the distinct characteristics of China’s 
human rights interpretation.25  
Western countries tend to condemn China’s non-cooperative behavior before 
attempting to understand its intention, and this is probably because China’s rapid growth 
is deemed threatening to the United States’ de facto superpower status. As Aaron L. 
Friedberg, a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, 
insists, “The United States and the People’s Republic of China are locked in a quiet 
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but increasingly intense struggle for power and influence, not only in Asia, but around 
the world…For as long as China continues to be governed as it is today, its growing 
strength will pose a deepening challenge to American interests.”26 South Korea, on the 
other hand, may be more neutral toward China’s rise to power because it is not as 
threatening to Korea’s security at the moment. By referring to both Western and non-
Western perspectives on China’s policies towards North Korea, this thesis attempts to 
offer a more complete picture of the situation of NKEC and the viewpoints of the 
interested countries. It should also be noted that this thesis does not condone the Chinese 
government’s human rights violations; instead, the author hopes to take China’s political 
and diplomatic concerns seriously and try to understand China’s passivity toward 
international criticism. 
 Since China is a key component of the North Korean refugee crisis, a profound 
understanding of China’s intention of treating NKEC and interpretation of their North 
Korea policy are vital to devise practical and effective measures to protect NKEC.  It is 
necessary to comprehend China’s perspective not only as an involved country in the 
NKEC problem, but also as a rapidly growing power in the region. Assimilating China’s 
perspective on North Korean refugee crisis will help the Western countries, including the 
United States, smoothly open up a dialogue to discuss universal human rights beyond 
NKEC issues.  
The author thinks that it is important to incorporate scholarship written in 
Korean by various South Korean scholars and institutions. The division between North 
and South Korea has prolonged for more than 60 years. Since the beginning of the 
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separation, South Korea has done the most profound and sophisticated research on 
unification and also about North Korea in various fields. South Korea has highly 
specialized government institutions that have strategized for unification, such as 
Korean Institute for National Unification, Ministry of Unification, Institute for 
Unification Education, and government led settlement institution such as Hanawon 
(the settlement Support Center for North Korean Refugees in South Korea). Not only 
the South Korean government institutions have put great efforts in this matter, but also 
countless South Korean NGOs and organizations have conducted first hand research 
and cooperated with the government in China.  
The collaboration between South Korean government institutions and their non-
government sectors have produced rich and well founded data about North Korean 
human rights violations, especially in China. Their annual reports contain the most 
detailed and up-to-date testimonies and researchers are well trained to catch even the 
slightest changes. The author wants to acquire various perspectives from resources that 
include the most prompt information reported. As a result, some of the research is so 
new that it is yet to be translated in English, and therefore, it was read in the original 
language.  
The author extensively refers to the Ki-hyun Lee’s interpretation of China’s 
strategy for keeping North Korea as its geopolitical strategic purpose, and the reason why 
China maintains such a treatment policy for the North Korean escapees in the thesis.27 
The author also adopts the Lee’s main framework in categorizing the North Korean 
escapees by different times: early 1990’s, mid-1990’s and early 2000’s. The Jung-hyun 
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Cho’s study28 is specifically referred to in sections 3.3-3.5 where several International 
Human Rights Commissions and their Committees are discussed. The author adopts the 
Cho’s main argument that certain parts of International Human Rights Law can be 
effectively used to overcome the limitations of the International Refugee Law, 
particularly for the North Korean escapees in China. The author also adopts the view of 
Cho on how the recommendations and interpretations of Committee Against Torture 
(CAT), Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Committee on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC), and Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
can be specifically used in helping the cases of North Korean escapees in China.29  
In order to analyze these different perspectives and their implications for 
international relations, this thesis will proceed in the following sequence: (1) Chapter 1 
primarily defines some important terms that readers need to be aware of and will explore 
the background of the massive movement and difficult circumstances of North Koreans 
in China; (2) Chapter 2 lays out conflicting views regarding the recognition of NKEC as 
refugees and human rights abuses toward NKEC in China; (3) Chapter 3 analyzes what 
kind of international obligations China is expected to comply with; (4) Chapter 4 
illustrates the tense relationship between the United States and China regarding North 
Korean refugee crisis and the new international responsibilities China needs to assume as 
a newly emerging global leader; (5) Chapters 5 discusses the South Korean government’s 
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stand on the crisis; (6) Lastly, Chapter 6 examines China’s different interpretation on 









Background Information of the North Korean Refugee Crisis 
 
The year 2015 raised the world’s awareness about refugees, as well as the 
conditions that force them away from their homes. The massive influx of refugees from 
Syria and other Middle Eastern countries revitalized the discussion of refugees’ political 
status and differentiated the concept of refugee and economic migrant. However, there 
has been another ongoing refugee crisis for more than half a century in China: refugees 
from North Korea have failed to achieve legal status in China because of China’s 
restrictive views of NKEC. The Chinese government recognizes them as economic 
migrants and not as refugees, whereas the South Korean government and the Statute of 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) view them as 
refugees.30  
Before the author dives into the main theme of this thesis—China’s 
responsibilities in respecting international refugee laws—it is important to define a few 
related terms, key concepts, and background information. In the following section, the 
author will define the concept of refugee, explain the principle of non-refoulement as one 
of the most important principles of the Refugee Convention, and demonstrate the 
reported reasons for mass refugee movement from North Korea. 
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1.1. Definition of Refugee 
 After World War II, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was 
temporarily established in order to systematically resolve the large number of refugees 
who were looking for a safer place to live.31 The more permanent UNHCR would soon 
replace IRO. Today, the UNHCR is the sole international institution that holds the 
important responsibility of providing aid for refugees. In 1951, the UNHCR published the 
“Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees” and a few years later, it published 
another refugee agreement, “The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”32 
These two documents define “refugee” as a person who has a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted because of one’s race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group, or political opinion. Along with this justifiable fear, the conditions for being 
recognized as a refugee include: a refugee cannot be protected by his or her country; is 
not willing to get assistance from one’s own country out of fear; became stateless by 
being outside of one’s country; or is not willing to return to one’s country.33  
Before we move on to consider the concept of “non-refoulement”, we must first 
clarify the definition of refugee. There are three basic requirements that refugee 
applicants must meet to be recognized as refugee. The first is well-founded fear.34 The 
refugee applicant has to have well-founded fear, whether it is subjective or objective, of 
being persecuted. The subjective principle is mainly based on the refugee applicant’s 
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psychological status. When determining what constitutes well-founded fear, how much 
the refugee has suffered and to what extent the refugee feels threatened by the event are 
considered. One’s ethnicity, religious, social, and political background and personal 
experience should also be taken into account as subjective principle of well-founded fear. 
As for the objective principle, the applicant’s testimony should be assessed with the 
applicant’s country’s situation in mind. Understanding the actual situation is a key factor 
in reliable estimation.  
The well-founded fear is closely associated with persecution.35 The 1951 
Convention considers the limiting or threatening of one’s freedom or rights of one’s 
ethnic, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group 
as persecution.36  However, according to article 33 of the Convention it is deducible that 
those who flee their country because of a natural disaster or starvation would not be able 
to achieve the refugee status. Even if one suffers life threatening hunger or danger due to 
disaster or starvation, it is still not considered persecution.37  
The third concept concerns race, religion, nationality, and the membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.38. Race includes every race without any 
exception. Persecution regarding religion means prohibiting one’s personal expression of 
belief, preventing religious education, or discriminating against one’s religion. 
Nationality is not only confined to “citizenship” but also includes every ethnicity, 
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religion, culture, and group of language. The membership of a particular social group is a 
group of people who have similar background or social class. Membership of a particular 
social group has significant overlap with the previous three factors: race, religion and 
nationality. Lastly, political opinion means everyone has freedom of expressing one’s 
political stance and no one can interfere with one’s expression of beliefs.  
However, the UNHCR has traditionally accepted refugees in broader terms 
beyond the definition ratified by the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. Today, the 
UNHCR considers the motivation of escape and classifies refugees in four different 
categories: political, economic, wartime and humanitarian.39 Political refugees are the 
same as what the other two Convention and Protocol define. Economic refugees are 
people who flee their country to escape starvation and economic hardships. Wartime 
refugees are people who escaped their country due to war or political unrest within the 
country. Humanitarian refugees are people who are threatened by natural disaster or 
massive human rights violation within the country. The conventional definition of 
refugee that only refers to political refugees is differing from the actual practice of 
recognizing refugees by the UNHCR.40 Since the actual interpretation is broader, this 
causes controversial discussion regarding refugee recognition.  
Despite UNHCR’s broader interpretation of the Convention and Protocol, some 
strict rule followers and concerned countries do not follow the practice of UNHCR. Some 
rule followers view people who flee for non-political reasons such as starvation and 
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natural disasters as immigrants, not as refugees. Therefore, these “immigrants” are 
excluded from refugee protection. In other words, they are not protected under the non-
refoulement law. This puts many asylum seekers in danger of getting deported. They are 
frequently sent back to the countries from where they flee. Once people obtain official 
refugee status, they are not only protected from coercive refoulement but they also can 
receive a new citizenship. However, when they fail to be recognized as refugee, they are 
at a high risk of refoulement.  
 
1.2. Non-refoulement 
The Article 33 of the 1951 Convention clearly articulates that no one should be 
forced to return to the country where there is a risk of persecution:  
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion.”41  
 
The principle of non-refoulement is both stated in the 1951 Convention and in the 
1967 Protocol, which is one of the internationally agreed upon principles. As stated 
above, refugees defined by both Convention and Protocol are considered political 
refugees. However, according to UNHCR’s practice, the asylum seekers who flee from 
their country to avoid war, military occupation, disaster, human rights violations, and 
severe starvation are considered humanitarian refugees. Political refugees are guaranteed 
non-refoulement under the Convention, but there is no written document to protect 
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humanitarian refugees from non-refoulement.42 This exclusion makes NKEC vulnerable, 
because they are considered as economic migrants. However, in 1981 the executive board 
of UNHCR, the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme (EXCOM) 
concluded that in all cases, the principle of non-refoulement should be strictly abided by.  
Once again in 1997, EXCOM broadened the concept of non-refoulement beyond 
that of both Convention and Protocol.43 Regardless whether an asylum-seeker is 
recognized as a refugee or not, the person should not be forcefully sent to the place where 
there is well-founded fear of being persecuted. Based on EXCOM’s interpretation of the 
principle of non-refoulement in 1997, even though NKEC are yet to be recognized as 
refugees, what China is doing is an apparent violation of international law.44 It is clear 
that when North Koreans are sent back they are treated as political prisoners who are at 
risk of losing their lives, as seen from Table 1.1.  
 However, China selectively chose to comply with the bilateral repatriation treaties 
in 1960 and in 1986 over the Refugee Convention and Protocol.45 Even if NKEC are 
viewed as refugees globally, since China is complying with the two bilateral treaties with 
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North Korea,46 it would not help North Koreans get refugee status in China. Therefore, 
the principle of non-refoulement is not applied to NKEC due to China’s persistent 
insistence.47  
 
Table 1.1. Punishments for Defections 
Testimonies Testifier ID 
• Deported from China in 2009 
• Sentenced to five years or correctional labor penalty 
after a pre-trial and trial 
• Sent to the Jongori kyohwaso in Hoeryeong, North 
Hamgyoung Province in 2010 
• Released thanks to a special pardon celebrating the 
65th anniversary of the Party’s creation (detained for 
2.5 years) 
NKHR2014000048 
May, 13, 2014 
• Deported from China in 2009 
• Sentenced to five years of correctional labor after a 
pre-trial and trial 
• Sent to the Hamhung kyohwaso in September 2010 
• Released thanks to a special pardon celebrating Kim 
Il-sung’s 100th birthday 
NKHR201400064 
June, 03, 2014 
 
• Deported from China in August 2009 
• Sentenced to five years of correctional labor penalty 
after a pre-trial and trial 
• Sent to the Jongori kyohwaso in Hoeryeong, North 
Hamgyoung Province in April 2010 
• Released thanks to a special pardon (served two 
years) 
NKHR201400090 
July, 15, 2015 
(adopted from White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2015, p 463)48 
 
 
1.3. Origin of NKEC 
The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union) 
at the end of the Cold War era enormously threatened North Korea’s leader Kim Il-
Sung’s dictatorship. Until the early 1990s, North Korea was highly dependent upon the 
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Soviet Union’s economic support. The breaking down of the Soviet Union was not only a 
bitter blow to North Korea’s politics, but also it adversely affected its already frail 
economy. In order to maintain its dictatorship and to self-sustain its economy, Kim Il-
sung had totally isolated North Korea from the outside world. Due to a combination of 
losing the Soviet Unions’ economic support and external assistance from other countries, 
North Korea had to stop its food distribution abruptly, which severely affected the life of 
North Koreans.49 However, the exodus of North Koreans out of their country did not 
immediately happen at the cease of food distribution in 1994. People individually found 
their own ways to survive, hoping that their government may establish a contingency plan 
to provide food. People who had relatives in China temporarily moved to China, but once 
they were able to attain food, they soon moved back to North Korea.  
The tipping point that triggered a massive movement of North Koreans to China 
occurred in 1995 after the extraordinarily devastating flood. The flood swept across 
North Korea’s most fertile region, South Hwanghae (Hwanghae Namdo) and North 
Hwanghae (Hwanghae Bukdo). This damage absolutely dashed North Koreans’ little 
hope for food. After the flood, the movement of people grew in larger scale, and once 
they were in China, their stay became nearly permanent. This situation that drove the 
North Koreans in limbo in China is, in part, is due to the mismanagement of economic 
plan by the North Korean government. The North Korean regime did not come up with 
appropriate measures for survival for its people, but rather left them alone. Myriads of 
civilians were not familiar with a self-sustaining system after living in the communist’s 
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system for five decades. The only options they had were to either starve to death or to 
flee.  
Only high officials and military had access to food resources at this time. These 
groups siphoned out all remaining scarce food supply in North Korea and sold them with 
an exorbitant price on black markets. The classes between the rich and the poor became 
extremely stratified, causing tens of thousands of people starve to death. According to the 
Korean Chinese that were living in China at that moment, the North Korean migrations to 
China reached its peak in 1997. The refugee influx raised about 10 times in 1997 
compared to that of 1996, and another 10 times in 1998 compared to that of 1997. After 
the flood damage slowly recovered and international aids were provided, the migration of 
North Koreans slowed down. However the North Koreans escape to China has yet to 
cease.  
 
1.4. Changes of North Korean Exodus Phenomena Over Time and China’s Different 
Policies About NKEC 
Generally, NKEC flee through China because the majority of North Korea’s 
northern boarder is shared with China (see Figure 1). The Chinese government has 
changed its policies dealing with these NKEC over time. It is hard to say that China has 
been consistent with its North Korean policies. Rather, China has repeatedly strengthened 
and eased its intensive border control based on its diplomatic relationship with two 
Koreas.50 For example, when China has a good relationship with North Korea, or when 
high officials from North Korea visit China, China starts to intensify its border control, 
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increase the frequency of refoulement, or conduct intense crackdown search for North 
Koreans illegally residing in China. In contrast, when China has to build a favorable 
relationship with South Korea, they tend to overlook North Koreans’ escapes and allow 
them to transit countries through China.  
Due to limited access to accurate information, it is almost impossible to estimate 
the exact number of North Koreans staying in China. However, according to the indirect 
and informal data collected from NGOs, human rights activists and researchers, it is safe 
to estimate that the North Korean population of NKEC rapidly increased during the 
1990s and dropped significantly in the 2000s. As the population of NKEC has changed, 
the Chinese government’s policies toward North Koreans have also changed accordingly. 
There were no significant incidents of North Koreans’ migrations across the border to 
China before the 1990s except for the Japanese annexation (1910-1945) and Korean War 
(1950-1953) periods. The current thesis focuses on the North Korean refugee crisis and 
its changes during the recent twenty years: 1990s-2010s.  
 




Figure 1. Regional Map of North Korea and Northern China51 
 
1.4.A. Before the 1990s  
During the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945), the industrial facilities were 
concentrated in the northern part of Korea, while the southern part of the Korean 
peninsula was mostly agrarian. For this reason, the northern part of Korea experienced 
industrial development even before the Korean War. North Korea was economically 
better off in terms of industry and natural resources at that time. The economic situation 
was quite the opposite from today. South Korea was worse off than North Korea. 
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Even after the Korean War, when both North and South Korea were devastated by 
the War, North Korea could rapidly overcome its economic hardships because of large 
amounts of aid from other communist countries such as the Soviet Union and China.  
North Korea’s prosperity, however, soon crumbled when North Korea’s economic 
development plans kept failing during the 1960s-1970s, and when it started to experience 
economic crisis particularly when the Soviet Union began to deteriorate in the late 1980s.  
Due to this situation, the term to describe North Koreans who fled to China was 
first discussed only in the 1990s, when there was the first massive emigration of people 
from North Korea since the Korean War.52  
 
1.4.B. Early 1990s: Escape for Survival Purpose & Connivance Policy 
The main reason for the escapes of for North Koreans in the early 1990s is to 
survive.53 During this period, most of the NKEC were residing in the border area in 
China, and they crossed the border to search for food. Many of them temporarily stayed 
with their relatives in China. Once they were able to obtain sufficient food for their 
families back in North Korea, they left China shortly after. Even though China had 
ratified treaties with North Korea in the 1960s and again in 1986 to control NKEC and 
deport them back to North Korea, China acquiesced them from residing in China for a 
short time.  
China was relatively friendly to NKEC because during China’s economic 
recession after the Great Leap Movement and Cultural Revolution, North Koreans helped 
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China to overcome the hardship as a brother socialist country and showed fraternity. 
During this period, North Korea assisted China with food, and Chinese, including Korean 
ethnicities, escaped to North Korea to avoid starvation. Since China had a similar 
experience in the past, Chinese in the early 1990s were more sympathetic to North 
Koreans. The Chinese government as well did not pay too much attention to the small 
amount of North Korean population at that time. The government believed they would 
leave as soon as the situation in North Korea is recovered.54   
 
1.4.C. Mid-1990s: Mass Influx of North Koreans & Strengthening of the Policies  
Towards the mid-1990s, the economic situation in North Korea did not get any 
better, rather got worsen. To make the matter worse, in 1995, the extreme flood destroyed 
breadbasket of North Korea, wiping out most of the crops, which was the last hope for 
North Koreans. Due to this extreme famine, massive amount of people started to cross the 
border again. It is important to note that the features of fleeing in the mid-1990s are 
significantly different from those of the early 1990s.  
First of all, the regions where people escape were expanded. In the early 1990s, 
most of the NKEC were people who resided in the boarder region. However, in the mid-
1990s, not only people from the border region, but also people from all around the 
country gathered around the Yalu and Tumen River to cross the border to China. The 
scope of people who escape significantly expanded in the mid-1990s.  Secondly, the age 
range of NKEC varied in the mid-1990s. Contrary to the early 1990s when most of 
NKEC’s age range was highly concentrated from 20s to 40s, in the mid-1990s, the 
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number of children, teenagers, and elders increased. Also the social class of people who 
escaped diversified as well. In the early 1990s, common laborers consisted in the 
majority of NKEC, whereas in the mid-1990s, people from various social classes— 
teachers, professor, doctors, and even high government officials— fled North Korea. 
Lastly, the duration of stay in China increased in the mid-1990s. Compared to the early 
1990s when most NKEC stayed just for the short period of time in China, in the mid-
1990s, people stayed longer or even started to settle down in China.  
Due to this change of escape pattern, the Chinese government changed its policy 
on NKEC to a more vigorous and aggressive policy from connive and relatively friendly 
one. On top of two other treaties that China had with North Korea, China passed criminal 
law regarding NKEC in 1997. In its amendment of criminal law, China expanded its 
punishment objects to its own people, Chinese as well.55 It says whoever helps North 
Koreans in the process of escape shall be punished accordingly. In 1998, China also 
strengthened the crack down on North Koreans’ illegal migration. Along with 
strengthening its intensive border control, the Chinese government extensively carried 
out refoulements during the mid-1990s.56  
 
1.4.D. After the 2000s: Increase of Orchestrated Escapes & Tightening Control 
Beginning of the 2000s, the dramatic change in fleeing phenomena is a significant 
decrease of the number of escapees from North Korea. Due to the China’s strengthening 
border control, and its reformation of domestic laws and policies that adversely affected 
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North Koreans, the population of North Korean escapees decreased significantly in the 
2000s. In response, the fleeing phenomena have changed into more orchestrated efforts. 
Since the border control intensified, it is hard for individuals to cross the border 
individually and avoid being caught.  Through the orchestrated fleeing aided by help 
groups or brokers, the form of illegal migration became more systematic. The brokers 
who organized the fleeing gathered the group of people and conducted the flight process 
with a careful plan. Brokers usually had close relationship with border guards, and they 
bribed them prior to the escape.57 The border guards would overlook the group of 
escapees, and let them cross the border. In the 2000s, despite the decrease of individual 
fleeing, the orchestrated fleeing actually increased. And the purpose of escape changed as 
well. People crossed the border not merely for survival, but for pursuing better lives.58  
 
 
1.5. Reasons of NKEC Movement from North Korea 
 
In the 1990s, the predominant reason for refugees’ influx to China from North 
Korea is to avoid dying from dire starvation. Starting at the end of the regime of Kim Il-
Sung, the founder of DPRK, North Korea could not sustain its food distribution policy 
due to the great famine. This led to the unprecedented chronic and nation-wide starvation 
called “Go-Nan-eui-Hang-Gun (Arduous March).” During this period, hundreds of 
thousands of people died of starvation in North Korea, causing a massive refugee influx 
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to China.59 In the 2000s, however, the motivations of escape have become more diverse. 
Contrary to previous cases, more and more high officials escaped over the North Korea-
China border, which implies that people escaped not only because of economic reasons, 
but also political reasons.60  
Gum-Soon Lee analyzes the motivations of flight and classifies those into two 
categories: push factors and pull factors.61 Push factors are the factors that make residents 
(e.g. North Koreans who live in North Korea) dissent about their living conditions and 
lead them to escape from their home country. Pull factors, on the other hand, are more 
related to external causes. For example, favorable living conditions in China or South 
Korea may trigger North Koreans to migrate to China or South Korea. Lee 
subcategorized these further to five push factors and six pull factors. 
  
1.5.A. Five Push Factors 
i. Starvation 
Starvation is the typical motivation of North Korean exodus. During the 
Arduous March period in the mid-1990s, the number of people who starved to 
death increased tremendously in North Korea.62 Seeing family members 
helplessly die of starvation, the remaining family members decided to escape the 
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country to seek food. The halt of government food distribution in 1994 worsened 
the situation. Initially, North Koreans sold their household items to earn money to 
buy food, but since the whole nation was starving, people could not last long in 
this manner. More and more people living near the border of places like North 
Hamgyeong Province escaped to three provinces in Northeast China ― Liaoning, 
Jirin and Heilongjiang.63 A large number of ethnic Koreans traditionally reside in 
these three northeastern provinces (東北三省). Many North Koreans have 
relatives in these three provinces so they could sustain their lives at least 
temproraily. However, increases in the North Korean population in Northeast 
China led to a higher unemployment rate in the region.64 Moreover, a number of 
NKEC were involved in criminal organizations causing social problems such as 
human trafficking, organs trafficking, and prostitution.65  
ii. Sense of Deprivation  
Previously, it was possible for the North Korean government to control 
outside information from spreading to its people. In order to prevent civilians 
from becoming dissatisfied when comparing North Korean regime with other 
democratic countries, the government manipulated the limited information. With 
the advent of the digital age, the North Koreans began to have better access to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Lee, “북한주민의	 국경이동	 실태-	 변화와	 전망 [Status of North Korean Migration Across the 
National Border - Changes and Prospects, translated by Jane H. Lee]”; Kim, “중국	 내	 탈북자	 문제	 
해결방안에	 대한	 연구  :	 독일과	 베트남의	 경험을	 중심으로 [Problems and Solutions of the North 
Korean Asylum Seekers in China: Focusing on the Experiences of Germany and Vietnam, Translated by 
Jane H. Lee].” 
64 Lee, “북한주민의	 국경이동	 실태-	 변화와	 전망 [Status of North Korean Migration Across the 
National Border - Changes and Prospects, translated by Jane H. Lee].” 
65 Ibid.	  
Lee    45 
information compared to the previous decades66. However, after seeing Arab 
Spring break down fellow dictatorships,67 the North Korean government 
prohibited the use of the Internet through devices, such as computers or cell 
phones to block access to outside information. Only a handful of high officials 
had access to the prohibited information. However, ever since the exodus to China 
due to starvation, more and more people saw what the outside world was like. 
People witnessed the incomparable development of China and South Korea. 
North Koreans felt betrayed by their own regime, which had been brainwashing 
them to believe that North Korea is the most developed and well-off country in 
the world.68 However, once they see the reality they started to admire the 
developments of China and South Korea and feel comparative deprivation of their 
own lives. This emotional effect acts as an important motivation for people to re-
escape if they are deported back to North Korea.  
iii. Fear of Punishment  
The crime rate has increased in North Korea since the mid-1990s due to 
the unprecedented starvation.69 The regime responded to the social disorder by 
strengthening the punishment for crimes such as bribery, smuggling drugs, 
counterfeiting, and robbery. Selling household items in the black market (Jang-
ma-dang) is considered an anti-socialism act and can also be punished. The 
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punishment against human trafficking is the most severe, resulting in execution. 
Also, even if one has not committed any crime, the person’s family member is 
suspected as an escapee, the entire family is degraded to underclass and forcefully 
exported to harsh living condition and placed under constant surveillance.70 For 
these reasons, people flee the country when they feel that they are at risk of being 
punished.  
iv. Intense Refoulement Investigation Process 
Even though the punishment for fleeing has recently been eased, NKEC 
still go through an intense refoulement investigation process that frequently 
makes them feel humiliated. This process includes beating, torture, and intense 
body search.71  
In the 1990s, all NKEC were considered political criminals and punished 
by being sent to political prisoner camps, forced to do hard labor, tortured, 
degraded to underclass, or forcibly exported.72 However, since the escapes 
became much more prevalent, the punishment was applied less severely. The 
North Korean government differentiated the punishments according to the 
NKEC’s length of stay, motivation of flight, contact with South Korean or 
Christian organizations, involvement in human trafficking, and so on.73 However, 
regardless of differentiating the punishments, the process of investigation is still 
conducted in an inhumane manner. Even after NKEC return to North Korea, they 
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go through discrimination and stereotype among the society. The continual 
scrutiny makes it hard for them to resettle and would eventually lead them to re-
escape, risking heavier consequences than before.  
v. Contemporary Aspect of Transition 
Beginning in 1998, humanitarian assistance from abroad has helped to 
relieve the economic crisis in North Korea.74 In the 1990s, people escaped due to 
more desperate life threatening situations. However, since the 2000s, people 
escape to earn more money and to seek for better living conditions.75 In other 
words, these days North Koreans voluntarily choose to flee to manage a better 
lifestyle.  
In the early stage of exodus, North Koreans who did not know the Chinese 
language became the easy target of exploitation.76 Learning Chinese helps NKEC 
to obtain higher opportunities of getting employed as cheap laborers. This 
motivating factor demonstrates similarity with illegal immigrants, rather than that 
with refugees. A lot of NKEC who work as cheap laborers in China earn money 
in order to send it to their families in North Korea and to help them make their 
way ultimately to South Korea. Since this phenomenon has become more 
prominent, the broker groups that help North Koreans cross the border became 
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more professional and systematic.77 These broker groups bribe two sides (China 
and North Korea) of border guards and coax them with connivance about flight.   
 
1.5.B. Six Pull Factors 
i. Protection and Support from Ethnic Korean Society Living in China  
A myriad of ethnic Koreans in China have relatives in North Korea. 
Ethnic Koreans in China were sympathetic to North Koreans during the early 
stage of refugee influx in the mid-1990s. Ethnic Koreans, on a personal level, 
acted in the capacity of protectors of NKEC.78 The NKEC were able to receive 
significant help from ethnic Koreans during the 1990s, particularly after the 
economic crisis of North Korea in 1994.  
On a broader scale, South Korea’s religious organizations continue to be 
major supporters in assisting North Koreans to safely arrive to their final 
destination, South Korea. However, as the North Koreans prolonged their stay, 
crimes involving NKEC increased, which made it harder for the aid groups to 
help North Koreans.79 Due to the treaties between China’s and North Korea’s 
government, and social problems caused by some NKEC, the Chinese 
government prohibited all kinds of assistance to North Koreans. The Chinese 
government has strictly punished individuals and organizations that help North 
Koreans’ illegal entry to China according to articles 318 and 321 of China’s 
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criminal law.80 These stronger regulations created obstacles, which makes ethnic 
Koreans difficult to provide support to NKEC.  
ii. Relief Activities by Non Government Organizations (NGOs) 
NGOs that are helping NKEC are conducting various relief activities. 
Internationally, NGOs focus on raising awareness of North Koreans’ human 
rights violation to the outside world. Their ultimate goal by raising awareness is to 
help North Koreans achieve legal refugee status so that they are protected by 
international laws.81 Regionally, NGOs provide food aids to North Korea. At the 
same time, they offer food, shelter, and clothes to NKEC who are living in hostile 
conditions scattered around Southeast Asia, and in some cases, help NKEC arrive 
safely to South Korea.  
The role of international NGOs is essential for NKEC these days because 
assistance from ethnic Koreans and religious organizations within China is 
decreasing due to the Chinese government’s strengthening punishments. 
International NGOs that are conducting relief activities can effectively raise 
awareness of human rights violations, and the importance and necessity of 
recognizing NKEC as refugees globally. They are trying to stop the inhumane 
treatment that NKEC encounter due to the lack of appropriate legal status.  
Many religious NGOs in South Korea protect NKEC and offer them food 
and shelters, while conducting mission work at the same time. They established 
Mission Home (orphanage, house church, shelters, etc.) in China’s three 
northeastern provinces and informally protect, educate, and nurture North Korean 
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orphans. Despite support from various NGOs and missionaries, these relief 
activities only provide temporary assistance in the aid processes. These supports 
are far from solving fundamental and structural problems of the North Korean 
refugee crisis.  
iii. Higher Job Opportunities in China 
There are far more ways to earn money in China compared to North Korea. 
For example, there is high demand of cheap labor in China’s farmland and other 
job markets. When North Koreans first arrive, they are not used to the new 
environment and they cannot speak Chinese. Some Chinese employers may take 
advantage of NKEC’s illegal status, and exploit them without paying for their 
labor. However, when North Koreans adapt to the new environment and learn 
Chinese, they have more employment opportunities with higher wages. It is 
unconstitutional for Chinese employers to hire NKEC, and if they are caught 
while hiring North Koreans as their laborers, they face punishment. Despite this 
risk, some Chinese still demand North Koreans as cheap labor force by exploiting 
their vulnerable status.  
iv. High Demand for Brides in China 
There is a high demand for North Korean women as wives of Chinese 
rural men. Due to the one child policy in China during the last several decades, 
the gender ratio between male and female has been severely skewed so that there 
are more men than women in China.82 In addition, since the onset of China’s open 
market era and accelerating industrialization, many Chinese women have moved 
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to urban areas or abroad for better work opportunities. This demographical shift 
and the fact that some of these Chinese farmers are struggling with physical or 
mental disabilities, or alcohol addictions make it difficult to find brides.  
Injunction with Chinese males in need of brides, female NKEC endure the 
situation of being victims of human trafficking in order to avoid refoulement. A 
myriad of these North Korean women are in high demand as sex partners of 
Chinese rural men, and are sold to them through the hands of human traffickers.83 
In order to prevent the female NKEC from fleeing, Chinese men threaten NKEC 
by using their vulnerable situations. Many female NKEC helplessly endure the 
sexual harassments and domestic violence to avoid refoulement. North Korean 
women have no legal protection to prevent them from being abused.  
Chinese males do not usually care whether the female NKEC are already 
married. Therefore, the age range of female NKEC who are sold by human 
traffickers as brides is fairly broad, from teenagers to women in their sixties, with 
women in their twenties to thirties being in the highest demand. Due to their dire 
situation, North Korean females comply with this unofficial human trafficking 
trend. However, China’s excessive biased gender ratio excludes North Korean 
males. Therefore, it is more common for North Korean females to stay in China 
compared to North Korean males.  
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v. Reunion with Other Family Members who are in China or South 
Korea  
Many North Koreans attempt to re-escape the country after their 
refoulement to North Korea. Many NKEC who are hiding in China are, once 
captured by Chinese law enforcement, forcefully returned to North Korea, while 
their family members may be left behind in China. Risking their lives, these 
people attempt to cross the North Korea-China border again to meet their family 
members they’ve been separated from.84  
Some North Korean brides who had been sold to Chinese rural males are 
returned to North Korea. However, like NKEC who re-escape from North Korea 
after their refoulement, it is possible that these women would attempt to cross the 
border once again to be united with their families.85 Many of them have children 
with Chinese men. Even though the marriage itself was not voluntary, and many 
of those women are not content in their marriage, the North Korean females still 
try to re-escape from North Korea to reunite with their children left in China. 
Reunion with family works as a major reason for North Korean females to cross 
the border again after their refoulements. For this reason, the North Korean law 
enforcement investigates whether the returned female is pregnant or not after her 
refoulement. It has been reported that if North Korean women are pregnant, the 
law enforcement conducts forceful abortions on these women.86  
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Along with the increase of family reunions in China, the population of 
NKEC who have reunited with their separated families in South Korea, their final 
destination, has also recently increased. This trend demonstrates that many of 
NKEC who have first settled down in South Korea try to help their other family 
members who are still in the process of fleeing by sending money. The settling 
NKEC receive the resettlement funds from South Korean government and they 
use this as resources for this effort. Many of them succeed and are able to reunite 
with one another in South Korea. Recently, the communication with family 
members who are living in North Korea has become possible through the brokers 
in China. Consequently, it got easier for family members in South Korea to get in 
contact with other family members in North Korea to plan their flight together.87  
vi. South Korean Government’s Protection and Support Policy of NKEC 
In 1997, the South Korean congress ratified “The Law of Protection and 
Resettlement of North Korean Refugees.” According to this law, the South 
Korean government has legal responsibility to protect North Koreans who request 
protection at any South Korean diplomatic offices in the foreign countries, with 
the exception of criminals. Once they enter South Korea, the government also 
guarantees to provide resettlement funds, rental houses, free education, living 
wages if necessary, health care, social adaptation education, employment 
education, fair employment and so on. In their early stages of exodus, North 
Koreans are hesitant to go to South Korea due to their stereotyped perception of 
South Korea that they had learned from North Korea’s propagandistic education. 
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However, once they hear more and more about the reality of South Korea during 
their stay in China, they begin to see South Korea as a land of hope and 
opportunity, and attempt to go to the country. 
 
1.6.  Summary 
Understanding these push and pull factors is essential to comprehend the 
motivation of NKEC to determine their escape, which endures harsh consequences. At 
first, the Chinese government overlooked their entry to China, but due to the North 
Koreans’ constant influx to the country, the Chinese government could no longer handle 
a large amount of refugees crossing their borders. China is apprehensive of North Korea’s 
collapse, which also concerns North Korea. In order to prevent this refugee movement 
that might possibly cause the breakdown of the North Korean regime, the two countries 
made bilateral treaties. However, these bilateral treaties constantly cause conflicts for 
China because of its multilateral treaties that it signed as a member state of international 
community. Some of China’s behaviors, in order to comply with the bilateral treaties 
with North Korea, contradict China’s responsibility as a member of multilateral treaties. 
China has been prioritizing the bilateral treaties with North Korea, violating multilateral 
treaties. This led China to be harshly criticized by international community. Now that we 
know why there is a constant flow of refugees from North Korea, and why China had to 
make the treaties with North Korea, it is important to examine China’s intention of 
remaining as a sole ally with North Korea, disregarding other countries’ dissuasions.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Causes and Results of the Problem: Conflicting Views and Human Rights Violations 
 
In the previous chapter, this thesis defined a few terminologies and reasons for the 
North Korean refugee exodus. This background information is essential for 
understanding the complex diplomatic and domestic concerns intertwined with the NKEC 
problem in China. In this chapter, the author will accomplish the following:  (1) 
demonstrate conflicting opinions in relation to recognizing NKEC; (2) specifically 
compare the positions of China and North Korea in viewing NKEC; and lastly; (3) 
describe the background discussion of NKEC’s lives in China.  
 
2.1. Views of Recognizing NKEC as Refugees 
 
2.1.A. NKEC Advocates 
Advocate groups that support NKEC rights, such as UNHCR, the South Korean 
government, and international NGOs, among others, argue that China should no longer 
avoid recognizing NKEC as refugees. These groups contend that it is rash judgment to 
assess one’s refugee status by only looking at one aspect of motivation.88 They view 
North Koreans crossing the border as not only fleeing from hunger but also from the 
totalitarian government. Although outer motivation of escape may be directly related to 
starvation, it is oversimplifying North Koreans’ motivations to say that they are crossing 
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the border simply because of starvation, risking their own lives and even families’ lives. 
These groups helping NKEC perceive that their motivations for escape not only come 
from economic reasons, but also considerably political reasons. NKEC advocates see that 
NKEC are hiding their political motivation because any subversive action is considered a 
serious felony that might cause negative consequences for the entire family, as seen from 
Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1. Cases of Discrimination due to Detentions or Political Prison Camps 
(kwanliso) 
Testimonies Testifier ID 
My uncle went to a political prison camp (kwanliso), and 
my cousin went missing, and so I could not advance to 
graduate school. 
NKHR2013000164 
July, 12, 2011 
I was discriminated because I had been to a ordinary 
prison camp (kyohwaso) and my brother was detained in 
a political prison camp (kwanliso) 
NKHR201100244 
November, 22, 2011 
Since my uncle had an ordinary prison camp (kyohwaso) 
detention record, I was dropped after having been 
selected by the Party Section 5 (which selects pretty girls 
to work for Kim Il-sung/ Kim Jong-il). 
NKHR2013000183 
October, 01, 2013 
One cannot work at Gaeseong Industrial Complex if one 
had been to a labor training camp (rodongdanryundae) 
NKHR2013000194 
October, 29, 2013 
I was selected by Section 5 of the Party, but because my 
father defected after detention in an ordinary prison camp 
(kyohwaso), my case was not processed. I gave up on 
college education, because I could not expect a good 
assignment even if I graduated from college. 
NKHR2013000223 
December, 10, 2013 
The defector sought to get into college, but he was not 
admitted on the grounds that he was a family member of 
a political prisoner. He was eventually assigned to a 
farm. 
NKHR2014000036 
April, 15, 2014 
As the defector’s aunt was sent to a political prison camp 
(kwanliso), the family background of the entire family 
was downgraded. As a result, one of his relatives, who 
was working as an officer at the Wisu Military Police in 
Pyongyang, was reassigned to an ordinary military unit 
in Nampo. 
NKHR2014000077 
July, 01, 2014 
The defector’s brother could not become Party staff 
because their grandfather was detained at a political 
NKHR2014000084 
July, 01, 2014 
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prison camp (kwanliso). 
(adopted from White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2015, p 185)89 
 
Even UNHCR, in which China is a member state, agitates that those who flee 
their countries in order to seek food may claim to be refugees sur place, because they 
may face persecution once they return.90 UNHCR’s broader interpretation beyond the 
Refugee Convention implies that economic and political motivations are so closely 
intertwined that it is hard to define refugee applicants’ motivations as one of the two. 
Treason against the Fatherland (Article 63)  
Those who betray the Fatherland by fleeing and surrendering to another country; 
those who betray the Fatherland or turn over secrets to the enemy; applies to 
extremely serious cases.  
(*The 2009 revision of the Criminal Law of North Korea included the death 
penalty as the maximum punishment)91 
 
According to the constitution of North Korea, any action that is against the 
socialist regime, such as escaping the country, or even attempting to do so is considered 
as treason.92 The lightest punishment is hard labor for 5 years of imprisonment, and in 
some severe cases, execution. Similarly, Sung-ho Jae also supports the idea that defection 
in North Korea is a foremost direct expression of challenging the regime and the 
representation of discontent with the political ideology93. He emphasizes, that even if the 
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primary motivation of escape is a result the starvation, the political meaning of escape in 
North Korea qualifies all NKEC as political refugees.  
Lastly, according to the United Nation’s annual report, Human Rights Report of 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea94, it is apparent that once NKEC are returned, 
they will suffer detainment, hard labor, persecution, torture, and, in extreme cases, 
execution.95 And as seen from Table 2.2, the female NKEC often face severe sexual 
harassment in the process of investigation once they are deported. Based on both Refugee 
Convention and Protocol,96 the country should not send asylum seekers back to their 
country if it is clear that they will face persecution.  
 
Table 2.2. Sex-Violence in the Investigation Process of Repatriation to North Korea 
Testimonies Testifier ID 
A North Korean defector* testified that without 
exception, the agents examined the uterus of all women 
deported from China. 
North Korea defector 
XXX,  
October 11, 2012 
Interview in Seoul 
A defector testified at Onsung SSD in 2011, the agents 
beat eight female inmates and inspected their uterus 
wearing surgical gloves. They would rub the gloves off 
the clothes before checking another inmate. XXX said 
inmates had to undergo the procedure again at Chongjin 
holding centers (jipkyulso). A young woman in her 20s 
had bled heavily after the uterus inspection, but agents 
did not give her proper treatment. 
North Korean defector 
XXX, 
October 5, 2012 
Interview in Seoul 
A defector testified that she had a uterus inspection at a 
border guard outpost. 
North Korean defector 
XXX,  
October 22, 2012 
Interview in Seoul 
When I was detained in the local SSD holding centers NKHR201300038 
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(jipkyulso) in Hyesan, Yanggang Province, the female 
agent pulled off my clothes completely, and checked my 
uterus without wearing sanitation gloves. She did not 
appear to be a military agent or jipkyulso agent. As she 
conducted the body-check, she said “If I don’t do it now, 
a man will do it later on, so be patient.” 
February, 19, 2013 
When I was forcible deported back to North Korea, a 
female agent checked my body on the first day of 
detention, both at local SSD detention center in Onsung 
County and at Onsung labor training camp 
(rodongdanryundae). She checked my uterus and forced 
me to do several sit-ups (so-called ‘pumping)’. 
NKHR2013000198 
October 29, 2013 
* Though the author tries to avoid using the term “defector,” because the thesis argues that the term does 
not fully encompass North Korean escapees’ situation in China, the word is retained in quotation to 
accurately represent sources material.  
(adopted from White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2015, p 368)97 
 
For these reasons, even if the primary reason of escaping is economic, given 
North Korea’s situation, an in-depth understanding of other significant motivating factors 
and the aftermath of the refoulement should be considered.  
 
2.1.B. Opposing Opinions 
The governments of China and North Korea, and several political scientists from 
China and South Korea, oppose recognizing NKEC as refugees. Even though there are 
several testimonies of previous detainees suggesting that once NKEC are sent back to 
North Korea they face severe torture and persecution, Tae-geun Lim, South Korean law 
expert regarding North Korean refugee, reports it is hard to prove.98 Lim says, “Since 
North Korea is one of the most isolated countries in the world, it is hard to secure positive 
evidence based on first-hand testimonies.”99 He observes that NKEC who were involved 
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in a political party or a bureaucratic cabinet in North Korea are probable to be recognized 
as refugees since they qualify as “member[s] of a particular social group,” but it is hard to 
regard the rest as refugees.100 China considers recognizing all NKEC as political refugees 
as stretching the concept of the legal refugee principles based on the Convention and 
Protocol.101  
Along with China and North Korea’s opposition, numerous scholars from China 
and South Korea argue that broadening the interpretation of refugee status is a distortion 
of the Convention.102 They interpret the text of the Convention and Protocol literarily, 
and believe introducing outside factors can distort the original criteria of refugee. The 
opposing side thinks that no matter what North Korean refugees’ hidden intentions are, 
since their primary and the foremost reason for escaping is economic, they should not be 
acknowledged as refugees.  
Moreover, China and North Korea argue that the processes of investigating 
NKEC and transporting them back to their country have undergone improvements.103 
Based on what the oppositions says, the process is conducted more humanely (see Table 
2.3). As Table 2.3 shows, the severity of punishment has been lessened and the amount of 
time of incarceration has been shortened. Therefore, they see that it is hard to say that 
NKEC have a fear of being punished when they are deported.104  
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According to testimonies of NKEC conducted by Korea Institute for National 
Unification, there is no such thing as due process or rule of law in North Korea despite 
the existence of the constitution.105 People are arbitrarily dragged to gulags, tortured, and 
treated inhumanely without any legal process. In some cases, the victim’s whole family 
becomes political prisoners and is sent to the gulags or coercively deported to hostile 
living conditions.106 South Korean scholars such as Lim are not entirely contradicting the 
fact that North Koreans will face danger or persecution once they are sent back. However, 
since the end of 1996 North Korea has eased its punishments in its constitution against 
NKEC who escaped because of economic reasons as seen from Table 2.3. Although there 
is no way to assure its practice, it is hard to find sufficient proof that North Koreans 
would still be severely persecuted when they are returned. Despite a myriad of 
testimonies, these allegations are hard to prove without objective evidences. A lack of 
openness of the regime makes it difficult to recognize NKEC as refugees.  
 
Table 2. 3. Comparisons of Penalty Provisions on Defection 
Old Criminal Law (October 19, 2009) Revised Criminal Law (May 14, 2012) 
Article 62 (Treason against Father land) 
If a citizen betrayed fatherland, fled or 
surrendered, or turned over state secrets to 
another state, he shall be sentenced to over 
five years of correctional labor penalty or 
capital punishment, plus confiscation of all 
personal property. 
Article 63 (Treason against Fatherland) 
If a citizen betrayed fatherland, fled or 
surrendered, or turned over state secrets to 
another state, he shall be sentenced to over 
five years of unlimited term correctional 
labor penalty; in more serious cases the 
penalty shall be life-term correctional labor 
penalty or capital punishment, plus 
confiscation of all personal property. 
Article 233 (Crime of Illegal Border Exit/ 
Entry) 
The crime of illegally entering/ exiting the 
border shall be given up to 2 years of labor 
Article 221 (Crime of Illegal Border 
Exit/Entry) 
The crime of illegally entering/ exiting the 
border shall be given up to 1 year of labor 
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training penalty; in more serious cases the 
penalty shall be up to 5 years of 
correctional labor penalty. 
training; in more serious cases the penalty 
shall be up to 5 years of correctional labor 
penalty.  
Article 234 (Crime of Assisting Exit/ 
Entry) 
In case a worker in the border management 
sector assisted in an illegal border crossing 
(exit/entry), he shall be penalized with up 
to 2 years of labor training; in repeated 
cases or in case bribery was involved, the 
penalty shall be up to 5 years of 
correctional labor penalty. 
Article 222 (Crime of Illegal Assistance) 
Illegally assisting anyone hostile to the 
Republic shall be penalized with up to 1 
year of labor training; in more serious 
cases, the penalty shall be up to 2 years of 
correctional labor penalty.  
(adopted from White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2015, p 450)107 
 
 
2.2. China’s Reasons for Not Recognizing NKEC as Refugees 
Determining whether an applicant is a refugee or not is decided by UNHCR.108 
Whether a country will accept the refugee as its citizen is outside of UNHCR’s authority. 
In other words, UNHCR does not have enforcement power to let North Korean refugees 
stay in China. Even if UNHCR acknowledges NKEC, if China denies their presence and 
residency, then there is nothing UNHCR can do.109 Russia has a history of accepting 
several North Koreans as refugees. Contrary to other countries, China has profound 
reasons for not recognizing North Koreans as refugees.110  
First of all, China made bilateral repatriation treaties with North Korea in 1960 
and in 1986.111 In those treaties, China guarantees that it would unconditionally return 
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NKEC whenever they are found.112 China promises to even punish Chinese who help 
North Koreans to escape or let them hide in their homes.113 
Even though China has been criticized for its inhumane treatment to NKEC, 
China has been abiding by these bilateral treaties ever since 1960 due to its political 
entanglement with North Korea. Not only China is a communist ally for North Korea, but 
also it values the geostrategic significance of North Korea for China’s security. North 
Korea acts as a buffer against direct contact with the United States’ allied countries, 
South Korea and Japan. China wants to prevent the United States’ influence from 
bordering directly with China, and North Korea is acting as a crucial fence against 
that.114  
Secondly, numerous scholars have interpreted China’s adhering to its repatriation 
policy as stemming from fear of North Korea’s possible collapse.115 If the North Korean 
regime collapses, there is a possibility of mass influx of North Korean escapees into 
Chinese territory.116 This will trigger more complicated dynamics of social, political and 
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economic problems to the Chinese government. Politically, if North Korea collapses, all 
the hidden practices of the human rights violations conducted by both North Korea and 
China would likely be revealed publically.  
Domestic economic confusion would be enormous as well. For instance, when 
Vietnamese were migrating out of the country to avoid the Vietnam War from the 1970’s 
to the late 1990’s, neighboring countries accepted them as refugees. The UNHCR was 
actively involved in distributing a large number of Vietnamese refugees to Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong Kong and others. These neighboring countries 
contributed the financial aids to support refugees’ temporary stays until the situation in 
Vietnam settled down.117 If China has to recognize North Koreans as refugees, China 
would need to provide a similar sort of assistance for them to settle down, which might 
burden the Chinese government’s national finance. The domestic unemployment rate of 
the Chinese population is already very high118 and if China accepts the mass amount of 
NKEC as part of its population, the unemployment would soar. The low wage job 
opportunities in China would be taken by lots of North Koreans because their vulnerable 
status as “illegal migrants” enable themselves to be exploited by Chinese employers at a 
very low payment (sometimes even without any payment). Since low wage jobs are filled 
up with numerous NKEC, the local Chinese who are looking for jobs have narrower job 
opportunities, facing further unemployment. Socially, the Chinese government assumes 
that the crime rate related to North Koreans would increase.119 Chinese criminal 
organizations would likely take advantage of NKEC’s defenseless situation and use them 
to commit crimes or in many cases exploit NKEC for human and organ trafficking. China 
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predicts that a lot of North Korean escapees who fail to integrate to Chinese society 
would get involved in criminal organizations.120 This would negatively affect China’s 
domestic security. 
Thirdly, the Vietnamese refugee case illustrates that the country where refugees 
are staying has an obligation to provide refugee camps or has to at least bear cost for 
refugees to stay in the country until they find another place to move.121 Almost without 
an exception, any country where refugees are dwelling, the country has to let UNHCR 
staff or other international NGOs come to the country. It is inevitable for China to face 
criticism for violating global human rights during the process of their involvement.  
As a member country of the United Nations and a state that signed the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, China has a moral obligation to abide by international 
refugee laws.122 However China is not willing to accept NKEC as refugees in order to 
avoid these consequences.   
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Figure 2. A Typical Escape Route for NKEC 123 
 
2.3.  North Korea’s Reasons for Stopping the Refugee Exodus 
As stated above, two treaties were ratified between North Korea and China that 
state China will not let North Koreans stay in its territory, and will send them back to 
North Korea.124 Instead of finding a solution to relieve famine during the 1990’s, the 
North Korean regime has taken even tougher measures to punish NKEC and to prevent 
potential escapees. North Korea has strengthened surveillance of its people, tightened 
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border guards, and also spread the fear that whoever goes to South Korea will be 
publically executed as seen from Table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4. Cases of Firing upon Defectors* 
Testimonies Testifier ID 
• 2009 
• Customs Bridge, Hyesan, Yanggang Province 
• Advance Warning : 3 times 
NKHR2012000154 
July 31, 2012 
• 2010 
• Hyesan, Yanggang Province 
• Victims: Two teenage boys from Hyesan, Yanggang 
Province 
• Assailant: Unknown 
• While the defector was held at a detention center, two 
of his fellows inmates, aged 17 and 18, tried to cross 
the border while at work. One of them was shot to 
death on the spot; the other managed to cross the 
river after being shot in one of his legs. One month 
later, he ended up being deported and suffered 
inhumane treatment at the detention center. 
NKHR201400068 
June 03, 2014 
• January 16, 2012 
• Wonjong Customs Office in Wonjong-ri, Rason 
(Sonbong County), North Hamkyoung Province 
• Victims: A 38-year-old woman (the defector) and 
two others  
• Assailant: Security agent (presumed) 
• While the defector and two friends of hers were 
crossing the river, a man believed to be a security 
agent fired at them from three meters away and 
followed them all the way to China. 
NKHR2014000020 
March 18, 2014 
• Victim: 1 male (37, a friend of witness) 
• Assailant: Border guards 
• There were warnings; and no resistance from the 
victim. He was killed. 
NKHR2013000231 
December 24, 2013 
• August 15, 2013 
• China 
• Victim: A man in his 40s (from Bocheon County, 
Yanggang Province) 
• Assailant: Border security guards 
• A group of 12 men and women crossed the river to 
collect blueberries in China. The border security 
guards shot at them immediately, although it is 
NKHR201400055 
May 20, 2014 
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unclear whether they fired live rounds or blanks. 
* Though the author tries to avoid using the term “defector,” because the thesis argues that the term does 
not fully encompass North Korean escapees’ situation in China, the word is retained in quotation to 
accurately represent sources material.  
(adopted White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2015, p 434)125 
 
In the 1990’s, NKEC were considered political criminals and the regime sent 
them to political prisoner camps. Not only was the person punished, but also his entire 
family was degraded to underclass and deported against their wills as seen from Table 2.5.  
 
Table 2.5. Cases of Forced Deportation 
Testimonies Testifier ID 
A neighbor was expelled from Hyesan, Yanggang 
Province in 2009 to Woonyoung County because his 
daughter crossed the river. Until June 2005, defectors* 
and their families were not linked. As permits increased 
and non-returnees increased, families were expelled since 
2007 
NKHR201200046 
March 23, 2012 
My son was sent to a labor training camp 
(rodongdanryundae) since he was caught using mobile 
phones in Hoeryeong in 2010. For this reason, we were 
forcibly banished from Gungsimdong, Hoeryeong, to 
Hwadae County, North Hamkyoung Province. 
NKHR201300048 
March 05, 2013 
Served at an ordinary prison camp (kyohwaso) on charge 
of economic crime. Upon returning home, we were 
forcibly banished from Samjiyon County, Yanggang 
Province to Kim Hyung-jik County. 
NKHR2013000187 
October 17, 2013 
In 2011, the families of defectors, workers in the border 
areas, and families of human traffickers were deported 
from Musan County, North Hamgyoung Province. In 
Musan, more than 70 percent were the families of 
defectors. Had heard about the ‘Open Musan County 
Plan’ to expel all the families of defectors from Musan, 
and fill the city with people unfamiliar with border 
regions. 
NKHR201200043 
March 20, 2012 
About 10 neighboring families were expelled in 2011 
alone. Most of them were economic crime cases. 
Expulsion was a one-sided order. They were sent from 
Hyesan to Shinhung-ri, Bocheon County, or Yanggang 
Province 
NKHR2012000155 
July 31, 2012 
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In April 2014, the nephew of Jang Song-taek and his 
family were deported from Sohung-dong, Chonjin, North 
Hamgyong Province to Hwadae County, North 
Hamgyoung Province. 
NKHR2012000077 
July 01, 2014 
Samjiyon County is Kim Jong il’s hometown. So, the 
families of defectors there and those who served at 
ordinary prison camps (kyohwaso) are forcibly banished. 
NKHR2012000226 
December 10, 2013 
Kim Jong-il pledged to make Wonsan as a second city 
next to Pyongyang. All the senior citizens, the disabled, 
and criminals were expelled. People who were rich in the 
provinces bribed officials to remain in Wonsan, utilizing 
the registry of the expelled people. 
NKHR2012000134 
July 10, 2012 
* Though the author tries to avoid using the term “defector,” because the thesis argues that the term does 
not fully encompass North Korean escapees’ situation in China, the word is retained in quotation to 
accurately represent sources material.  
(adopted from White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2015, p 204)126 
 
Contrary to what the North Korean regime expected, people kept escaping the 
country despite massive risk. The regime attempted to display a softer image to prevent 
North Koreans from being acknowledged as refugees by outside countries. The regime 
eased the degree of punishment to convince other countries that NKEC will not face 
persecution once they are returned.127 
  
2.4.  Human Rights Crisis of NKEC in China 
 Most NKEC have to pass China in order to reach South Korea, their likely final 
destination (see Figure 2. on page 55). The reason that North Koreans have to go though 
China despite a huge risk of refoulement is because a high-voltage electric fence line runs 
between North and South Korea. It is nearly impossible to cross it without being 
electrocuted. Although it is called DMZ (De-Militarized Zone), the borderline is the most 
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heavily militarized zone in the Korean peninsula. For these reasons, the majority of 
NKEC cross the Tumen River to go to China.  
The NKEC are at a high risk of being exploited during their escape. Not only does 
the Chinese government not recognize NKEC as refugees, but they also regard efforts to 
help NKEC in Chinese territory as illegal. There are myriads of horrible testimonies from 
NKEC about infringement of their human rights in the escape process.128 
Yoon-jeong Kim categorizes commonly happening human rights violations in 
China into three major areas: human trafficking, forced labor, and refoulement.129 Kim 
divides human trafficking into smaller categories: forced marriage, prostitution, and 
organ trafficking.130 As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, there is high demand for 
brides in China due to the gender imbalance caused by the One Child policy, with 
overwhelming preference of sons to daughters during the last several decades.131 In order 
to solve a lack of brides in China, a lot of young North Korean girls become targets of 
bride selling. Most of these women are in their teens or early twenties. They are sold to 
old, mentally ill, or disabled Chinese men almost as sex slaves.132 This kind of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Do et al., White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2015. 
129 Kim, “중국	 내	 탈북자	 문제	 해결방안에	 대한	 연구  :	 독일과	 베트남의	 경험을	 중심으로 
[Problems and Solutions of the North Korean Asylum Seekers in China: Focusing on the Experiences of 
Germany and Vietnam, Translated by Jane H. Lee].” 
130 Ibid. 
131 Lee,	  “북한주민의	 국경이동	 실태-	 변화와	 전망	  [Status	  of	  North	  Korean	  Migration	  Across	  the	  
National	  Border	  -­‐	  Changes	  and	  Prospects,	  translated	  by	  Jane	  H.	  Lee]”;	  Kim,	  “중국	 내	 탈북자	 문제	 
해결방안에	 대한	 연구  :	 독일과	 베트남의	 경험을	 중심으로	  [Problems	  and	  Solutions	  of	  the	  North	  
Korean	  Asylum	  Seekers	  in	  China:	  Focusing	  on	  the	  Experiences	  of	  Germany	  and	  Vietnam,	  Translated	  
by	  Jane	  H.	  Lee].” 
132 Kim,	  “중국	 내	 탈북자	 문제	 해결방안에	 대한	 연구  :	 독일과	 베트남의	 경험을	 중심으로	 
[Problems	  and	  Solutions	  of	  the	  North	  Korean	  Asylum	  Seekers	  in	  China:	  Focusing	  on	  the	  Experiences	  
of	  Germany	  and	  Vietnam,	  Translated	  by	  Jane	  H.	  Lee]”;	  Lee,	  “북한주민의	 국경이동	 실태-	 변화와	 
전망	  [Status	  of	  North	  Korean	  Migration	  Across	  the	  National	  Border	  -­‐	  Changes	  and	  Prospects,	  
translated	  by	  Jane	  H.	  Lee].” 
Lee    71 
arrangement is against most North Koreans’ wills. Some of them even have husbands and 
children back in North Korea. Middlemen who conduct human trafficking usually 
threaten young North Korean girls to obey their demands or else they will hand them 
over to Chinese law enforcement so they will send them back to North Korea. Since these 
girls are outside of legal protection, a lot of them endure mental and physical abuses.133 
Even after they are married to Chinese, they are still not free from fear of being deported 
to North Korea.  
Although most women are sold as brides, some women are sold as prostitutes. 
These arrangements are certainly against their will but conducted coercively by many 
middlemen, due to their illegal status in China. These voiceless women are forced to 
work as sex slaves and are often fettered to do hard labor. It is not only through sex 
trafficking, but also organ trafficking that these refugees are abused. Although there is no 
definite evidence that proves illegal organ trafficking has been revealed, based on some 
testimonies and given the hostile treatment to NKEC,134 it is highly possible that coercive 
organ trafficking happens in China targeting NKEC.  
 Forced labor is another human rights violations in China.135 Human trafficking is 
mostly targeted to certain aged female NKEC, but forced labor abuses span across 
genders and age spectrum including children. Once they are sold, NKEC have to yield 
submission to the owner, trying to earn at least a minimum amount of money they need to 
get through the escaping process, but most of them are not paid fairly for their hard labor. 
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Since they are not protected by the Chinese government, but rather considered as illegal 
migrants, even if they are treated unfairly or are abused, they cannot report to the police. 
Reporting can put them in danger, possibly deportation. Because of this hopeless 
situation, a lot of North Koreans become victims of sweatshops in China.  
The last, but not least, is the problem of human rights violations after deportation. 
Once NKEC are handed to the Chinese security police, the process of deportation is often 
inhumanly conducted.136 Interrogators deliberately do an excessive strip search, 
sometimes involving sexual harassments, and torture to degrade human dignity. Women 
are generally targeted with severe human rights violations.137 Even though protection of 
pregnant women is guaranteed by international law138 and also in the North Korean 
constitution,139 in practice, this right is clearly violated. Interrogators would force 
pregnant women to do hard labor, beat them up or even inject drugs to cause abortion.140 
In cases of women giving a birth, mothers are not allowed to take care of their infants but 
they are rather forced to let infants die naturally.141 As seen from Table 2.6, children are 
not an exception in this ruthless deportation process. They are treated same as adult 
detainees. Regardless of gender, age, and health condition, NKEC, once they are sent 
back, would face severe human rights violations in North Korea.142 
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Table 2.6. Cases of Children in Detention  
Testimonies Testifier ID 
A North Korean defector* testifies that in 2008, he saw 
adults and children thrown into the same room at Group 
6.20 in Pyongsung, South Pyongan Province. 
NKHR2011000101 
April 26, 2011 
A North Korean defector testified that in 2010, he/she 
saw a 15-year-old boy who was mobilized for forced 
labor while detained at an ordinary prison camp 
(kyohwaso). 
NKHR2011000247 
December 20, 2011 
A North Korean defector testified that in 2010, he was 
only 17 years old, but he was detained in detention 
facilities of border guard, Local branch of MPS, and 
“inspectors agency.” At these facilities he was severely 
beaten.   
NKHR2012000187 
May 22, 2012 
A North Korean defector testified that in 2009 a 13-year-
old boy was given a labor-training penalty for having 
watched a South Korean video. 
NKHR2012000095 
May 29, 2012 
A North Korean defector testified that in February 2010 
in a local SSD detention center in Musan County, North 
Hamgyoung Province, his/ her 16-year old son was 
detained for 15 days on charges of receiving remittance 
by his parents from China. He was often beaten and put 
to forced labor before he was able to escape from the 
center. 
NKHR2011000134 
June 07, 2011 
A North Korean defector testified that in 2011 in Sakju 
County, North Pyongan Province, he/she saw a 14-year-
old boy detained on charge of using a USB on his 
computer. He was beaten while detained in a rooming 
house, and about 40 other boys underwent similar 
punishment. 
NKHR2011000105 
May 03, 2011 
A North Korean defector testified that he was forcibly 
deported from China and detained in a local SSD 
detention center in Hyesan, Yanggang Province. He was 
only 16 at the time but was thrown into an adult 
detention facility. 
NKHR2011000142 
June 14, 2012 
I was born in 1997, and in 2011 I was detained in a 
holding center (jipkyulso) in Shinuiju, North Pyongan 
Province. During the interrogation, the agent struck me. 
NKHR2013000032 
February 19, 2013 
* Though the author tries to avoid using the term “defector,” because the thesis argues that the term does 
not fully encompass North Korean escapees’ situation in China, the word is retained in quotation to 
accurately represent sources material.  
(adopted from White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2015, p 397)143 
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2.5.  Summary 
In this chapter, this thesis has explored two conflicting views of recognizing 
NKEC as refugees, and each of China and North Korea’s reasons for violating the 
international refugee laws. Lastly, it briefly demonstrated how human trafficking, labor 
exploitation, and refoulement, among other human rights violations, are harming NKEC.  
Even though China is a member state and has a moral obligation to abide by 
UNHCR’s Refugee Convention and Protocol,144 China continues to violate UNHCR’s 
Convention and Protocol by deporting North Korean escapees that flee to China. The 
UN’s lack of enforcement contributes in part to China’s violations of the international 
treaties and laws. In order to grasp a comprehensive understanding of the complexity of 
China’s violations of treaties and laws, it is important to understand the United Nations’ 
effort to persuade China to abide by the international refugee laws. It is also essential to 
evaluate what kind of legal conflicts and informal relationships are intertwined among the 
United Nations, China, and North Korea. In the next chapter, the author will discuss 
potential solutions to compensate for the weakness of both Refugee Convention and 
Protocol.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
China’s Lack of Compliance with International Treaties 
: Compensating International Refugee Laws with International Human Rights Laws 
 
The North Korean refugee crisis is not only a regional problem, but also an 
international problem involving various countries. North Korean escapees are citizens of 
North Korea based on international law, but South Korea’s constitution also defines them 
as South Korean citizens.145 China and Russia contain the largest number of North 
Korean asylum seekers in their territories.146 Transit countries, such as Mongolia, 
Thailand, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam have to deal with NKEC as well. The North 
Korean refugee crisis adds challenges to the international human rights and refugee 
protection issues for major Western countries like the United States and EU member 
states are involved in.147 
In this matter, the author is greatly inspired by Jung hyun Cho’s work.148 This 
thesis adopts Cho’s main interpretation about NKEC issues. Cho discusses how the North 
Korean escapee issues have resulted in the question of enforcement issues of international 
law, the lack of enforcement of international refugee law, compensating international 
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human rights law in order to overcome the weakness of international refugee law, and 
China’s obligations of five human rights commissions. These are discussed in this 
chapter. 
 Due to this interrelationship among various countries, international community 
such as the United Nations (UN) stepped forward to grapple with the problem, using 
international refugee laws.149 However because of the international refugee laws’ lack of 
enforcement, China continues to violate treaties. In this chapter, the author will explore 
what the UN has done to solve the issue in its own way, and discuss the possible 
solutions in utilizing international human rights laws to complement international refugee 
laws’ weaknesses. After, the author will list the human rights laws in which China is 
obligated to comply with, and analyze each of the human rights committee’s concerns 
and suggestions regarding China’s human rights abuses towards NKEC.  
 
3.1. The United Nations’ Adoption of the North Korea Resolution 
Contrary to the 59.5 million refugees worldwide who are protected under the 
refugee laws, North Korean asylum seekers in China are excluded from legal protection 
of international institutions.150 In reality, it is hard for NKEC to request for their legal 
protection to Chinese public institutions because this can lead them to arrest, 
imprisonment, and refoulement. Chinese government considers more than 10,000 of 
NKEC as illegal immigrants151,152 and rules them out of attaining legal refugee status. 
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This makes NKEC’s status vulnerable, leading them to become victims of human rights 
violations such as refoulement, labor exploitation, and human trafficking.153 
 The United Nations’ Sub-Commission on Human Rights adopted International 
Protection of Refugees in 2001 and in 2002.154 In this resolution, the United Nations 
applied broader interpretation beyond the Refugee Convention’s criteria. The UN also 
emphasized outlawing refoulement is the obligation of member states of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Human Rights Covenant.155 Besides 
these legal compulsions, the United Nations underscored the necessity for special 
protection of women and children asylum seekers who flee their countries because of 
starvation and poverty.156  
 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights also passed resolutions 
regarding the North Korean human rights situation in 2003, 2004, and 2005.157 
Subsequently, the United Nations Human Rights Council passed resolutions in 2008, 
2009 and 2010. In these resolutions, the United Nations criticized North Korea’s 
inhumane treatments toward NKEC who had been returned. The UN expressed its 
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concerns of the absence of human rights in concentration camps where prisoners 
constantly suffer from severe torture, humiliation and, in extreme cases, execution.158 In 
addition, the UN General Assembly constantly urges North Korea to stop the inhumane 
punishment and induce China and North Korea to follow the principle of non-
refoulement.159 
 In 2002’s Resolution, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights assigned 
specialists who mainly focus on the North Korean human rights situation.160 The UN 
requested the specialists to thoroughly investigate and report the situation annually.  
 Despite all these efforts, the North Korean government does not acknowledge 
these resolutions and refuses to cooperate with the UN.161 Also, notwithstanding the fact 
the China signed both Refugee Convention and Protocol, the Chinese government 
persistently violates the principle of non-refoulement. China has exercised vigilance 
toward UNHCR’s intentions and disallowed the access of UNHCR to monitor the human 
rights situation of North Korean asylum seekers in China,162 fearing potential 
establishment of refugee camps. Therefore it is difficult for UNHCR to assist the North 
Korean refugees publically in a transparent manner. This is why it is hard for UNHCR to 
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3.2. China and International Human Rights Law 
Whenever China faces international criticism of violating the principle of non-
refoulement, the government insists that it has been managing North Korean asylum 
seekers in compliance with the domestic law, international law, and humanitarian 
principles.163 The International laws that China is referencing are the Refugee 
Convention, the Refugee Protocol, and bilateral treaties4 with North Korea. However, 
multilateral international refugee treaties and bilateral treaties with North Korea have 
conflicting views of recognizing North Korean asylum seekers as refugees. These 
conflicting views lead China to pick one treaty to abide by, while violating the other one. 
China is prioritizing bilateral treaties and sending NKEC back to from where they fled.164  
Based on the United Nations’ interpretation of the Refugee Convention in 1951 
and the Refugee Protocol in 1967,165 more than 10,000 North Korean asylum seekers in 
China have well-founded fears of being persecuted based on political opinion, religion 
and their memberships in political social groups. At the very least, if the Chinese 
government were to grant NKEC humanitarian status, it would begin to obviate the fear 
of persecution that NKEC suffer. The NKEC meet the qualifications to be recognized as 
refugees, but the Chinese government is denying this interpretation, despite its duty as a 
member state of UNHCR.   
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Due to the deficiency of domestic refugee recognition procedures and the absence 
of an international institution to monitor China’s implementation processes for 
recognizing refugees, it is unlikely for NKEC to be recognized as refugees even if they 
have profound reasons to be seen as such. The absence of a commission to monitor 
compliance situations in China is the major weakness of the international refugee laws. 
To strengthen this deficiency, utilizing the International Human Rights Law that has 
specific commissions can be an effective alternative to the international refugee laws. 
Commissions of the international human rights treaties have greater ability to enforce the 
law than the international refugee law, which does not have any commission.166  
 
3.3.  International Human Rights Law vs. International Refugee Law 
As other international laws have weaknesses in monitoring member states’ 
performance, International Human Rights Law also has flaws. Despite having a better 
system of monitoring countries’ compliance with treaties, the International Human Rights 
Laws’ commissions do not fully guarantee compliance.167 However, international human 
rights law certainly is strong enough to make up for the shortcomings of international 









Lee    81 
3.3.A. Expanded Protection of International Human Rights 
  In order to obtain legal protection under refugee law, the person has to be 
recognized as a refugee. If the person fails to achieve legal refugee status despite the clear 
evidence, he or she is excluded from the protection.  
Realistically, refugee status only has a declaratory effect. Attaining refugee status 
and finding a place to live is, again, a different matter. Even after the person is officially 
acknowledged as a refugee, if the country did not want to accept him or her in its country, 
the person might not find a place to live. Specifically, if China refuses to accept NKEC 
by considering NKEC as illegal immigrants or economic migrants, then Refugee 
Convention and refugee law are ineffective.  
However, according to international human rights law,169 even if the asylum 
seekers are not refugees but illegal migrants who escaped because of economic reasons, 
they are still protected just because they are human. Of course, it should be 
acknowledged that International human rights law is not perfect. Although it purports to   
protect every human being’s rights regardless of whether the person is recognized as 
refugee or not, international human rights law lacks strong enforcement. However, 
compared to international refugee law, which has no law-binding mechanisms, 
international human rights law has at least some power to enforce its authority and offers 
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i. Stronger Enforcement of International Human Rights Law 
International Refugee Law originated from the 1951 Refugee Convention, which is its 
sole foundation.170 However, International Human Rights Law not only includes the two 
human rights treaties of 1966171 but also has specific and detailed treaties about racial 
discrimination, torture, women, children and more. In terms of content, human rights law 
offers broader and stronger protection compare to the refugee law. For example, the 
Convention Against Torture172 also has the principle of non-refoulement as in the 
Refugee Convention. The major difference is that the international human rights law has 
a broader scope of eligibility and stronger enforcement compared to that of the Refugee 
Convention.  
ii. Various Monitoring Commissions of the International Human Rights Law  
The monitoring commission system is the most prominent strength of international 
human rights law.  In China’s case where the government is apparently violating 
international law, international refugee law does not have any commission to mandate the 
country to abide by the law. However, international human rights law has a myriad of 
monitoring commissions to pressure the country to follow the law.173 By using these 
monitoring commissions of human rights law, it is possible to overcome the weaknesses 
of refugee law.174  
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3.4.  Types of International Human Rights Commissions and Their Roles 
There are six major human rights treaties and they all have monitoring 
commissions:175  
A. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR 66) -
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)176 
B. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 66)- Human Rights 
Committee (CCPR)177 
C. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICEPR 66)- Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD)178 
D. Conventional on the Elimination of All Forms Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW 79)- Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW)179 
E. Convention Against Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT 84)- Committee Against Torture (CAT)180 
F. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC 89)- Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC)181 
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Each committee has its own monitoring mechanisms in order to oversee the 
member states’ compliance situation. Regularly member states of these conventions have 
to submit periodic national reports to every committee, and then each committee reviews 
the reports and announces concluding observations or comments. Usually, the 
committees pinpoint violations and wrongdoings of the country and adduce 
improvements and suggestions.  
Some of these committees have petition procedures, with each one having 
different methods. CCPR, ICEPR and CAT have inter-state communication systems, 
whereas committees like ICCPR, ICERD, CEDAW and CAT have individual 
communication systems. Furthermore, CEDAW and CAT conduct confidential 
investigations on inquiries when they find out credential reports of systematic and 
organized human rights violations. Moreover, in CAT’s optional protocol in 2006, CAT 
newly introduced periodic visits of confinement places.182 Both inter-state and individual 
communication systems have a quasi-judicial function, which makes international human 
rights committees far more influential compared to international refugee laws. 
Theoretically, CAT’s principle of non-refoulement can be particularly useful to 
mitigate the North Korean refugee crisis. However, in reality, these committees have a 
hard time exerting their influence over the North Korean refugee crisis in China. This is 
because China has been effectively blocking the access of these committees, including 
CAT, and is preventing them from investigating China’s compliance with international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 “Convention	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child,”	  November	  20,	  1989,	  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx. 
182 Cho, “국제인권법상	 탈북자의	 보호가능성	 및	 그	 실행 [The Protection of North Korean Escapees 
under International Human Rights Law and its Practice: with special reference to the International Human 
Rights Treaties to which China is a Party and their Monitoring Mechanisms, translated by Jane H. Lee].”	  
Lee    85 
human rights conventions. China did not ratify the necessary procedures to make 
individual communication systems feasible for CERD, CEDAW and CAT. Therefore, 
inter-state and individual communication systems are not practicable in China. 
Despite China’s effort to block the access of committees, China is still obliged to 
submit periodic national reports to five of the conventions except for ICCPR 66.183 
Without exception, all five of these committees have expressed their concerns over 
China’s inhumane treatment of NKEC and its violation of the principle of non-
refoulement.184,185 China is a member state of these five committees, who pressured 
China to comply with human rights law and offer humanitarian treatment to NKEC. Even 
though these committees’ concluding observations or comments are not legally binding, 
at the very least, China has to come up with reasonable justification of its international 
law violations. During its preparation of response to those international criticisms, China 
would possibly reform its domestic laws, policies, and customs corresponding to 
international human rights laws.  
The country normally submits its response report to the committee within 4 to 5 
years after receiving concluding observations or comments. Nevertheless, China has not 
responded back to those comments after the committees’ denunciation of the exploitation 
of NKEC.186  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185	  CERD	  has	  expressed	  this	  issue	  in	  2001,	  CESCR	  and	  CRC	  in	  2005,	  CEDAW	  in	  2006	  and	  CAT	  in	  2008.	  
186 Cho, “국제인권법상	 탈북자의	 보호가능성	 및	 그	 실행 [The Protection of North Korean Escapees 
under International Human Rights Law and its Practice: with special reference to the International Human 
Rights Treaties to which China is a Party and their Monitoring Mechanisms, translated by Jane H. Lee].” 
 Lee   
 
86 
3.5.  Suggestions of International Human Rights Treaties to China 
 
3.5.A. Committee Against Torture (CAT) 
The Committee Against Torture (CAT) announced the following concluding 
observations on December 2008 after reviewing China’s 2008 periodic report:  
“The Committee is greatly concerned by allegations that many individuals have 
been forcibly returned to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, without any 
examination of the merits of each individual case, and subsequently been 
subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by 
the authorities. The Committee notes with concern that these individuals are 
referred to by the State part as “illegal immigrants” or “snakeheads” and that 
such label presume that these individuals are not deserving of any protection. ….. 
Under no circumstances should the States party expel, return or extradite a 
person to a State where there are substantial grounds for believing that the 
person would be in danger of being subjected to torture. …. In the light of the 
large numbers of citizens of the above State who have crossed into China, the 
State party needs to be more active in ensuring that the obligations of article 3 
are fully met. …”187  
 
-CAT, “Concluding Observations: China” 2008  
 
As seen from the periodic report, the CAT rejected China’s perspective of seeing 
NKEC as illegal immigrants.188 The CAT insisted that NKEC had well-founded fears of 
being persecuted once they were deported. Considering this fact, the CAT condemned 
China’s refoulement of NKEC. Along with this, the CAT pressured China to conform to 
Article 3 of the General Assembly Resolution, which was ratified on 10 December 
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1984.189 The CAT explicitly clarified that China’s refoulement of NKEC is a violation of 
Article 3, and emphasized that China should adopt Article 3 into its domestic law as well. 
 
 Article 3       
 
 1.   No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be 
in danger of being subjected to torture.        
 2.   For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the 
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations 
including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent 
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. 
 
 -United Nations, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984190  
 
 
 Even though the Refugee Convention in 1951191 also has the principle of non-
refoulement, CAT’s principle of non-refoulement192 is far more influential for the 
following reasons:  
i. As with human rights treaties, the CAT covers not only refugees but also every 
human being without an exception. The CAT has broader applicability than the 
Refugee Convention.  
ii. The Refugee Convention requires the applicant to fulfill all the criteria for 
refugees in order to be protected Human rights treaties, however, do not require 
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the applicant to satisfy certain requirements. The dignity of man qualifies as 
reason enough to be protected under the human rights treaties.  
iii. The CAT prohibits the exception of returning or expelling criminals in the 
Refugee Convention.193 The CAT fully protects every human being regardless of 
criminal background.  
 
 The significance of this convention is the CAT comes before the bilateral 
treaties between China and North Korea if these two conflict. It is ideal to avoid conflict 
between multilateral treaties (in this case the Convention Against Torture) and bilateral 
treaties (treaty between China and North Korea), but if this is unavoidable, multilateral 
treaties that have jus cogens194  should be prioritized. China is fully aware of this and 
even acknowledged that the Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture should be 
prioritized before the bilateral treaties with North Korea.195 In reality, however, China 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Clause 2 of the Article 33, The 1951 Refugee Convention. “The benefit of the present provision may not 
be, however, claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the 
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly 
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.”  
194 Cho, “국제인권법상	 탈북자의	 보호가능성	 및	 그	 실행 [The Protection of North Korean Escapees 
under International Human Rights Law and its Practice: with special reference to the International Human 
Rights Treaties to which China is a Party and their Monitoring Mechanisms, translated by Jane H. Lee].” 
195 Ibid.	  
Lee    89 
3.5.B.  Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) announced 
the following concluding observations in 2001 after reviewing China’s periodic report in 
2001:  
“ While noting the State party’s effort to facilitate integration and naturalization 
of Indo-Chinese refugees in mainland China, the Committee is concerned that 
different standards of treatment are applied to Indo-Chinese asylum-seekers, on 
the one hand, and asylum-seekers of other national origins on the other, notable 
with regard to the right to work and education. Particular concern is expressed 
regarding the treatment of asylum-seekers from the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Korea [sic], who are reportedly systematically refused asylum and 
returned, even in the cases when they have been considered to be refugees by 
UNHCR. The Committee recommends that the State party take the necessary 
measures to ensure that all refugees and asylum-seekers receive equal treatment. 
To this end, the Committee recommends that the State party consider pursuing the 
adoption of formal legislative or administrative provisions in order to implement 
objective criteria for the determination of refugee status.”  
 
- CERD, “Concluding Observations: China” 2001196  
 
The CERD criticized China’s unequal treatment towards asylum seekers based on 
their ethnicity. The CERD particularly pinpointed China’s discrimination against North 
Koreans. The CERD denounced China’s systematic refoulement because it defies 
UNHCR’s mandate to accept NKEC as refugees.197 In a stunning display of hypocrisy, 
China is accepting more than thirty million Chinese-Vietnamese as refugees and offering 
relatively generous treatment.198 Moreover, the Chinese government has partially 
allowed UNHCR’s access to individual evaluation of legal refugee status for Pakistani, 
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Somali, Iranian, Afghani and other asylum seekers,199 but entirely blocked the access to 
North Koreans.  This is the violation of Article 1 of International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.200  
 
Article 1 
1. In this Convention, the term "racial discrimination" shall mean any distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other 
field of public life. 
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, General Assembly resolution 2106, 21 December 1965201 
 
China has cooperated with UNHCR and offered relatively lenient treatment to 
other asylum-seekers such as Vietnamese, but none of this treatment was offered to 
NKEC. The CERD insisted China guarantee equal protection to all the asylum-seekers 
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3.5.C. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
After reviewing China’s periodic report in 2006,203 the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) announced the following 
concluding observations:  
“ 33. While noting that the State party is also party to the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees, it is concerned at the lack of laws or 
regulations for the protection of women refugees and asylum-seekers. The 
Committee expresses particular concern at the situation of North Korean women, 
whose status remains precarious and who are particularly vulnerable to being or 
becoming victims of abuse, trafficking, forced marriage and virtual slavery.  
34. The Committee calls upon the State party to adopt laws and regulations 
relating to the status of refugees and asylum-seekers, in line with international 
standards, in order to ensure protection also for women. The Committee 
recommends that the State party fully integrate a gender-sensitive approach 
throughout the process of granting asylum/refugee status in close cooperation 
with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It 
specifically encourages the State party to review the situation of North Korean 
women refugees and asylum-seekers in the State party and to ensure that they do 
not become victims of trafficking and marriage enslavement because of their 
status as illegal aliens.”  
 
-CEDAW, “Concluding Comments: China” 25 August 2006204 
The CEDAW is attentive that more than three-fourth of NKEC are women and 
majority of them are enduring their hostile conditions to avoid refoulement.  
Among the serious concerns addressed were human trafficking, abuse, and forced 
marriage targeting female NKEC.205 The CEDAW is aware of North Korean females’ 
deplorable exploitation and has admonished the Chinese government to actively step 
forward to stop the human rights violations.  
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The CEDAW suggested China affiliate with UNHCR to make more a women-
friendly environment for asylum-seekers.206 The CEDAW also recommended China 
reform its domestic law in more humanitarian ways and stop the refoulement.207 Along 
with the CEDAW’s instructions, punishing local human traffickers and operators of sex 
industries exploiting NKEC and renouncing refoulement policy can make a huge 
difference.  
 
3.5.D. Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) reviewed China’s periodic 
report in 2005 and announced the following concluding observations in November of that 
year:  
“ 80. …. [The Committee] is further concerned that children entering 
mainland China from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are 
categorically considered as economic migrants and returned to the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea without consideration of whether 
there are risks of irreparable harm to the child upon return. 
82. The Committee recommends that the State party extended all human rights 
guarantees in its Constitutions and in the Convention to all Children within its 
jurisdiction on both the mainland and the SARs [Hong Kong and Macao], 
including refugees, asylum-seekers and other undocumented migrants. In 
particular, the Committee recommends that the State party: … (b) Ensure that 
no unaccompanied child, including those from the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, is returned to a country where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that there is a risk of irreparable harm to the child, for 
instance through disproportionate punishment for violating immigration laws, 
in accordance with the Committee’s general comment No. 2 (2005) on 
unaccompanied minors; …”.  
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-CRC, “Concluding Observations: China (including Hong Kong and 
Macau Special Administrative Regions)” 24 November 2005208 
 
The CRC prohibited refoulement of children by all means regardless of their legal 
status.209 The CRC was worried about the situation regarding North Korean children’s 
refoulement. It was aware that once they were returned to North Korea, they would face 
“a risk of irreparable harm” even at their young age. The CRC recommended that China 
extend its protection of human rights in its Constitutions to offer full assurance of 
children’s security.210  
Children are one of the most vulnerable social groups of NKEC besides women. 
Myriads of North Korean orphans escape the country by themselves after losing their 
parents by starvation or refoulement in the process of escaping. They sustain their lives 
through begging and stealing and cannot get proper education and care.  
Recently, as the population of female NKEC who are forcibly married with local 
Chinese men has increased, the children born between them have raised a new issue.211 
The Chinese government does not legally acknowledge forced marriage between NKEC 
and Chinese men. To make the matter worse, their children are excluded from birth 
registration, effectively rendering them invisible in the eyes of the government.212 This 
prevents them from getting an education even if they become school-aged children. In 
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this sense, China has been overtly violating Article 22 of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child.  
 
Article 22 
1. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is 
seeking refugee status or who is considered a refugee in accordance with 
applicable international or domestic law and procedures shall, whether 
unaccompanied or accompanied by his or her parents or by any other person, 
receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in the enjoyment of 
applicable rights set forth in the present Convention and in other international 
human rights or humanitarian instruments to which the said States are Parties.  
- Convention on the Rights of the Child, General Assembly resolution 
44/25, 20 November 1989213 
Per article 22, regardless of Children’s legal status as refugee, the country should 
offer them protection and humanitarian assistance.214 China, however, has been deporting 
North Korean children, knowing the human rights abuses that they will face once they are 
back.  
 
3.5.E. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
Following China’s periodic report in 2005,215 the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (CESCR) announced the following concluding observations in May:  
 
“ 14. … The Committee notes that some asylum-seekers are excluded by the 
refugee determination procedure of the State party, in particular those coming 
from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, who are regarded by the State 
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party as economic migrants and are thus compelled to return to their countries. 
… 
45. ….the Committee urges the State party to ensure that its asylum procedures 
do not discriminate, in purpose or in effect, against asylum-seekers on the basis of 
race, colour or ethnic or national origins, as provided for under article 2, 
paragraph 2, of the Covenant. The Committee recommends that the State party 
consider adopting subsidiary forms of protection to guarantee the right to remain 
for persons who are not formally recognized as refugees but are seeking asylum 
and nevertheless require protection during that period, and granting the Unite 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and humanitarian organizations access 
to them. …”  
 
-CESCR, “Concluding Observations: People’ Republic of China (including 
Hong Kong and Macao) 13 May 2005216 
 
In this observation, the CESCR pinpointed NKEC’s being entirely excluded from 
consideration as potential refugees and forcefully deported.217 The CESCR banned China 
from discriminating against asylum-seekers based on their ethnicity and nationality. It 
also emphasized that China is violating Clause 2 of Article 2 of the General Assembly.  
Article 2  
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the 
rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without 
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.  
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December 1966218 
Article 2 emphasizes the equal protection of rights regardless of a person’s race, 
ethnicity, religion, and more. The CESCR also suggested the Chinese government to 
collaborate with UNHCR, provide humanitarian protection to those asylum-seekers who 
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fail to achieve legal refugee status, and establish certain policies to enforce this 
resolution.219 Moreover, it insisted China allow the access of UNHCR to these asylum-
seekers.220   
 
3.6. China’s Response to International Criticism 
China’s compliance records with conventions are satisfactory in terms of 
procedure. Despite its frequent late submissions, China has regularly submitted its 
periodic reports. After the UN reviews China’s periodic report, they give China 
suggestions and recommendations to meet the standard of UN membership. Ideally China 
has to adopt those recommendations; however, China has neglected those comments, 
insisting on their sovereignty. The UN conventions have criticized China’s mistreatment 
of North Koreans and recommended ways to mitigate violations of North Koreans’ 
rights. In China’s replies to CAT’s comments, China refused the committee’s suggestion 
by saying that CAT’s recommendation “runs counter to the principle of impartiality and 
objectivity, [and] therefore is not acceptable to the Chinese side.”221 China also has 
objected to further examination by the UN monitoring system insisting that the 
convention’s comments are “vilifying and baseless.” Instead of adopting those 
recommendations or opening dialogue with its critics, China tends to respond in one of 
two ways: either with hostility towards public censure or an unwillingness to 
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communicate, often to the point of completely withdrawing from the international 
community.222  
For example, on February 17, 2014, the UN’s Commission of Inquiry on Human 
Rights in North Korea published a 400-page report criticizing North Korea’s “widespread 
rape, torture, forced abortions, and other atrocities in its network of labor camps.”223 
Along with the publication of the landmark report, the UN also raised the possibility of 
accusing Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un in the International Criminal Court.224 As a 
response to this public criticism, the North Korean ambassador to the UN, So Se Pyong, 
insisted that this report was a fabrication by hostile powers including the United States to 
tarnish the image of North Korea. Not only was North Korea enraged after the 
publication of the report, but also China was outraged and protested the UN commission 
in an effort to defend North Korea.225 Contrary to the UN’s accusations, China insisted 
that North Korea did not commit “crimes against humanity.” China’s representative, 
Chen Chuandong, a counselor at China’s mission in Geneva, denounced this 
unprecedented indictment of North Korea as “divorced from reality.”226 He concluded 
that the report is unreliable because of “the inability of the Commission to get support 
and cooperation from the country concerned.”227 China has been shielding its ally from 
condemnation for its human rights violations. 
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The UN commission is aware that many deported North Koreans are sent to 
prison camps or even publically executed.228 Moreover, the UN denounces China’s 
repatriation of North Korean escapees is also a crime against humanity.229 Chinese 
officials denied allegations related to China’s human rights violations toward North 
Korean refugees230 and accused the UN Commission’s report of leveling “unreasonable 
criticism.” Chen defended China’s repatriation saying that “The Koreans who enter 
illegally, they have breached China’s laws and border administration,” adding that “They 
enter illegally, they are not refugees.”231 At another press briefing, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs spokeswoman Hua Chunying also defended China’s repatriation policy by 
referring to North Korean refugees as “illegal border-crossers” and insisting they should 
be exempt from refugee protections.232 She went on to add that China treats them “in 
accordance with international and domestic laws and the humanitarian principles.”233 She 
continued, “We believe that politicizing human rights issues is not conducive towards 
improving a country’s human rights. We believe that taking human rights issues to the 
international criminal court is not helpful to improving a country’s human rights 
situation.”234 Hua did not reply to any other questions regarding China’s disallowance of 
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UN investigators to the Northeastern border area where many North Koreans enter China 
illegally.235  
Due to the absence of an international human rights court, the monitoring system 
of each convention is the sole means of holding each country accountable to international 
human rights treaties that it has signed.236 Until recently, the UN conventions have been 
trying newer and stronger methods of enforcement, but China continues to resist 
complying.  
According to the UN Commission’s chairman Michael Kirby, the Chinese 
government has blocked the access of the Commission’s entry into China several times, 
thoroughly banning the access to regions where lots of North Korean refugees are 
residing. China also opposed the establishment of the Commission and refused to 
cooperate with the UN commission to investigate the situation of North Koreans.237 The 
Chinese government also refused to allow UN staff to meet and interview 
“representatives of churches and other organizations” that help NKEC.238  
Scott Snyder, a North Korea expert at the Council of Foreign Relations, said 
“[The UN report] is very strong indictment of North Korea, but China is clearly right 
there in the mix, and that’s the reason why they were reluctant to co-operate.”239 
Encouraging China to be more transparent and cooperative with the UN Commission is 
an essential step to mitigate human rights violations of NKEC, but China has a tendency 
to remain silent; as Snyder states, “And so the main purpose of the report, beyond making 
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the case for a continued international responses to North Korea through the international 
criminal court, is to move China.”240 Even though China has remained silence as it has 
been criticized for its non-cooperation with the UN Commission, some observers still 
think this report could pressure China to reform its North Korea policy. Human rights 
advocates noted that increasing support from numerous countries of the UN action on 
human rights violations in North Korea would demand China to abandon its custom of 
supporting North Korea.241   
 
3.7. Summary 
It is notable that all five human rights committees voiced their concerns 
specifically over the NKEC’s human rights violations in China. Five committees 
commonly urged China to come up with appropriate measures to resolve its wrongdoings. 
Regarding its abuses of human rights, China is receiving massive pressure from 
international society. Above all, the North Korean refugee crisis in particular is much 
more complicated compared to other domestic human rights abuses in China, because the 
issue is entangled with other international laws. Even though China has obligations to 
abide by international laws, it constantly violates the international refugee laws and 
deports North Koreans back to the place from where they fled.  
It is possible to devise effective solutions by complementing international human 
rights laws with international refugee laws to persuade China to comply with 
international law. Both international refugee laws and human rights laws do not fully 
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guarantee China’s compliance, but using various methods and approaches would lead to 
desirable changes in China’s treatment toward NKEC.  
China’s violation of international treaties would tarnish its international prestige 
as a superpower. Practically, however, international reputation seems intangible, which 
would not directly harm tangible matters like China’s economy or policy. However, in 
the diplomatic arena, myriads of sectors are intertwined with one another, and breaking 
















Geopolitical Context of North Korean Refugee Crisis 
: Relationship between the United States and China 
 
4.1. China Caught between Cooperation and Competition 
China’s numerous violations of multilateral treaties of human rights would likely 
demean China’s image as a trustworthy diplomatic partner. And this may hinder other 
Western world countries from making treaties with China due to its irresponsibility of not 
complying with human rights and refugee treaties. In the long-term, China may lose its 
potential partners that might otherwise enhance China’s economic and international status 
in the future. In conforming to multilateral treaties, China can build trust among other 
neighboring countries. They would eventually yield greater profit.  
The United States and China are two superpowers often referred to as G2. These 
two countries constantly compete with each other in the international arena to achieve 
ultimate hegemony in global arena. China’s “String of Pearls”242 allows China to exert 
influence over the Indian Ocean. In order to counter China’s expansion, the United States 
contains China through its “Asian Pivot Strategy”.243 However, these two countries are 
major economic partners, exchanging massive amounts of imports and exports. The 
United States is a number one importer of Chinese merchandise, and China imports the 
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largest amount of US’ agricultural products.244 The United States and China walk a fine 
line between competition and cooperation.  
This complex relationship causes China’s and the United States’ diplomatic bonds 
to fluctuate every time they hold conflicting opinions.245 In this regard, the disagreements 
on human rights issues, specifically the recognition of NKEC as refugees, might create a 
new arena of confrontation. If the exodus of NKEC keeps increasing to the point where it 
catches enough attention from international community, the Untied States will be 
pressured to act on its responsibilities as a superpower to resolve the problem. Regardless 
of the United States’ motivation for taking action, whether voluntary or compulsory, the 
United States will oppose China, demanding China to comply with the treaties that it 
signed. This dispute could cause a strain between these two countries that might possibly 
adversely affect other diplomatic sectors. In this regard, China’s noncompliance to the 
international treaties and continued biased support for North Korea might seem beneficial 
in the short term, but would harm China’s reputation as a trustworthy superpower and 
hinder China from becoming a leading country on the world’s stage. 
 
4.2. China Prioritizing its Economy as an Emerging Superpower 
China has become a world’s superpower at an unprecedented pace, challenging 
the status of the current de facto superpower, the United States. This emerging state has 
gone the extra mile to attain hard power and economic competitiveness, but its soft power 
has yet to catch up with its hard power. China is keenly conscious of its international 
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prestige. Considering China’s past unpredictable foreign policy, however, it is likely that 
China is having a hard time chasing two hares at once.246 The Chinese government has 
put its economic development at the top of its national political agenda.247 Given that 
China’s primary goal is its national economic development, if China cannot pursue both 
hard and soft power, it would probably prioritize economic growth over prestige. Unlike 
the United States, China has been passively reacting to international criticism about its 
human rights violations and blocking outside information that might instigate civil 
discontent.248  
After the Chinese economic recession in the 1980s, former Chairman Deng 
Xiaoping created a unique domestic policy that is called “Chinese capitalism,” which 
allows communism and capitalism to coexist. 249Devastated by China’s economic 
downturn, Deng made this new policy to restore the economy and the policy clearly 
implied China’s strong willingness to grow its economy at any cost. Despite international 
criticism, China may put human rights issues aside. It is not likely that China would give 
up its economic interests. China has been actively developing its economy, becoming the 
world’s new economic powerhouse.  
China’s reluctance to respond to the international community’s criticism on 
human rights issue implies that public censure might not be an effective tool to urge 
China to change. Approaching China in more practical and tangible ways might be a 
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better way to persuade this newly emerging superpower. Bearing in mind that the 
public’s criticism has shown to be ineffective, the international community should find a 
new diplomatic approach to persuade China. 
 
4.3. Denuclearization and the United States’ Diplomatic Engagement with  
        North Korea 
 
Despite the truce of the Korean War in 1953, the United States is still technically 
at war with North Korea. Although the United States and North Korea have been trying 
to achieve respectful relations for more than half a century after the War, the two 
countries have yet to establish a stable relationship. This challenge is in part due to North 
Korea’s unpredictable provocations as well as the United States’ sanctions that follow.250 
The complicated diplomatic and military problems between North Korea and the United 
States must be resolved for the international security of the region. The experience of 
arduous and inconsistent progress between the two countries for such a long time 
suggests that perhaps it is time for the United States to change its approach towards North 
Korea.  
 North Korea’s totalitarian regime has been passed down through three 
generations, isolating itself further from outside engagement. It is unlikely that its 
leadership will surrender and dismantle the most effective tool to maintain its regime and 
to guard against foreign aggression:  nuclear weapons.251 Despite this expectation, the 
United States foreign policy with North Korea has remained primarily focused on 
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“denuclearization” and “disarmament.”252 Although it may be a rational goal to promote 
world peace, this is an unfair and unacceptable demand in North Korea’s perspective 
unless there is a significant incentive to counter their loss and risk. Emphasizing the 
denuclearization issue alone can discourage North Korea from participating in 
negotiations. It may be the time for the United States to evaluate other diplomatic 
approaches that do not focus solely on sanctions and denuclearization.  
There are many areas outside of denuclearization that the two countries can 
engage in negotiation, such as improving human rights issues. Recently, the winds of 
change have been blowing in terms of the United States’ approach towards North Korea. 
Since the beginning of the 2010s, the United States has started to speak out about North 
Korean human rights issues, actively advocating the UN’s North Korean human rights 
resolution. Making progress in this area not only opens up the floor for discussion, but 
can also further the goals of both countries. 
 
4.4. The United States’ Active Measures to Mitigate North Korean Human Rights 
Abuse  
Compared to other Middle Eastern refugee crisis, the North Korean refugee crisis 
was out of general attention, even though the violation lasted more than a half a century 
and abuse that the refugees have to endure is indescribably severe. One of the reasons 
why North Korean refugees are relatively unwatched is because North Korean refugees 
are ‘voiceless’. They cannot actively voice for their rights partly because they were not 
aware of what rights they have due to the totalitarian education received in North Korea. 
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Their rights have been neglected throughout their lives in DPRK. Moreover the tight 
relationship between China and DPRK put North Korean refugees extremely dangerous 
condition, which will halt them from advocating for their rights. Since NKEC do not have 
legal status in China, their residing in China is considered “illegal.” Once NKEC are 
caught by Chinese police, they are likely to be repatriated. This is why even if NKEC are 
aware of universal rights that they have, they tend not to advocate for them because doing 
so would expose their vulnerable status.  
 Given this NKEC’s deplorable situation, it is important for the United States to 
conduct appropriate measures to mitigate the problem as human rights advocate country. 
According to the United States Department of State, the United States has been actively 
stepping forward to resolve North Korean human rights abuse.253 Ever since the release 
of the UN Commission of Inquiry report in February 2014,254 the United States pressured 
DPRK further in order to stop its human rights abuse, by raising international awareness. 
The United States’ DPRK human rights policy has focused on giving voice to the 
voiceless by collecting substantial amount of first-hand data by conducting interviews 
with North Korean refugees.255  
 Robert R. King, Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues, 
announced in his special envoy for North Korean human rights issues before the 
committee on Foreign Relations of the United States senate that the United States has met 
with many NKEC and collected their testimonies and used them as living evidence to 
prove DPRK’s serious human rights violation. NKEC are deemed to represent the 
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millions of North Koreans who are denied enjoyment of Human Rights and fundamental 
freedoms.256 Collecting the first hand data is not only to increase international attention 
for the ongoing Human Rights violations, but also “to record the violations committed by 
the regime, in order to hold those perpetrators accountable for their abuses.”  
Moreover, the United States continues to cooperate with a number of international 
community and NGOs. The most important step that the United States has taken is 
establishing the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Seoul, 
South Korea to closely monitor and investigate the human rights situation in the DPRK.  
It seems like the United States’ increasing pressure on North Korean human rights 
has been fruitful. After constant international pressure in response to its human rights 
abuse, North Korea sent its foreign minister to the high level session of the UN General 
Assembly in September 2014 for the first time in 16 years.257 Senior DPRK officials 
frequently visited other UN member states to compel them to vote against resolutions that 
condemn North Korea’s human rights abuses. Also, the United States has put an effort to 
increase information accessibility in DPRK. Even though it is extremely difficult to 
interact directly with North Korea, the United States has recently seen indications that 
information from the outside is becoming more accessible in North Korea.258 Although it 
is illegal to listen to foreign radio or watch a television show besides pre-set or state-
controlled information channels, testimonies by many NKEC prove that the increased 
number of people have experiences of listening or watching foreign radio or videos.259 
The United States believes that international media are among the most effective means 
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of sharing information about the outside world and enlighten the residents of North Korea.  
The United States claimed that it would continuously be a strong supporter to encourage 
the free flow of information in North Korea.260 
 Solving the NKEC problem, however, is not a bilateral issue between the United 
States and North Korea. China is a major stakeholder who has complicated security and 
economic interests entangled with North Korea. Therefore, the United States cannot 
disregard China’s stand on this issue, but should rather try to understand the main 
diplomatic issues and various interests and intentions of China. However in reality, 
getting theses two superpowers to cooperate is not as easy as it sounds, because NKEC 
problem is intertwined with other diplomatic concerns.  
 
4.5. Human Rights Issues Entangled with Other Diplomatic Sectors 
Even though violating international refugee laws seems separate from diplomatic, 
political and economic relations, diplomacy by its nature is much more complicated and 
entangled with various factors.261  In 2012, the tense relationship between China and the 
United States developed after the United States accepted the blind Chinese human rights 
advocate, Chen Guangcheng, in their embassy in Beijing. Chen was a well-known human 
rights lawyer who was imprisoned for four years after he criticized the government’s 
“One Child Policy.” He insisted that the Chinese policy coerced women to have forced 
abortions, which was a violation of their human rights. Even after his discharge from jail, 
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Chen was under house arrest. The Chinese government conducted heavy surveillance of 
him and his family every day and every night. Chen managed to remove himself from the 
eyes of surveillance and fled to the United States embassy in Beijing to ask for an 
allowance for his exile to the United States.  
After hearing this news, the Chinese government insisted the United States hand 
over Chen, claiming it as a domestic matter. The United States did not immediately allow 
Chen’s exile to the United States. The United States hesitated to make any decision that 
would force it to choose between the favorable diplomatic relationship with China and 
the responsibility as a country to advocate for human rights. The United States did not 
want to hurt its diplomatic relationship with China by allowing Chen’s exile, but at the 
same time, the whole world was watching the United States’ decision. After the United 
States changed its focus from practical national profits to upholding an international 
image as a human rights advocate, it cautiously chose to fulfill its responsibility as a 
superpower by prioritizing human rights. The United States eventually allowed Chen’s 
exile to the United States.262  
The United States’ decision of accepting Chen sparked diplomatic crisis between 
the two countries. Even though this example is different in nature, Chen’s case does have 
some similarities with the NKEC issue; both illustrate that when refugee issues are 
entangled with human rights, the concerned countries’ positions are complicated, which 
also hurts other diplomatic sectors. Chen’s case and the NKEC case share similarities in 
terms of involving diplomatic tension between China and the United States regarding 
human rights issues, but there are significant differences too. Chen’s case did not require 
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compliance with a treaty, whereas the NKEC case did. Also, in Chen’s case, the United 
States had the final say regarding the issue, whereas the decision of the NKEC case 
resides with China. The fact that China does not abide by the international treaties and 
China has the final say in the circumstance make the situation more complex and more 
unpredictable.  
 
4.6. China’s Changing Attitude Concerning the United States  
Chinese elites are very conscious about tension with the United States. In order to 
improve their relationship, the Chinese elites desire to establish a strong bilateral 
connection with the United States.263 Through this bilateral affiliation, Chinese leaders 
want to alleviate the aggressive and tense relationship with the United States, and avoid 
the Thucydides trap.264  
The fact that China has become one of the fastest growing superpowers assigns 
greater responsibility to China. With growing in stature and international recognition, 
China is expected to be a global leader for other countries by respecting international 
regulations, and to cooperate with international community to solve the North Korean 
refugee crisis, which can potentially cause instability in the region. It would be desirable 
for China to reform its domestic laws and customs in accordance with international laws, 
and show active participation in restoring peace to the region by respecting human rights. 
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4.7. North Korea’s Provocations in 2016 
On January 6, 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test.265 Enraged 
international community including the United States quickly condemned North Korea for 
its provocative conduct. The United States is particularly sensitive to this issue because 
North Korea’s provocation threatens its national strategic interests and the security of its 
allies, South Korea and Japan. The United States not only furiously criticized North 
Korea’s thoughtless action, but it also directly demanded China to play a more serious 
role in stopping North Korea from committing further provocations, as they threaten 
international security.266 Aside from the United States’ demand to China, China also had 
its own serious national interest issue because of its new global leadership. 
The United States has been urging China, North Korea’s sole ally, to take a 
hardline policy by restricting exports of oil that help sustain North Korea’s military. 
China has refused the United States’ requests and continued to support North Korea to 
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ensure it does not collapse. Because of China’s inaction, the United States announced in 
early 2016 that it would consider deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) missile defense system to South Korea to defend it from North Korea’s 
nuclear threat. China reacted harshly to this measure as they view the deployment of the 
THAAD system in South Korea as a clear threat to the stability in the Western Pacific 
region and also to the security of China.267 Although China opposes North Korea’s 
nuclear test, it cannot turn its back on North Korea, despite harsh international criticism 
about its position. North Korea’s confidence in China’s continuous support incites North 
Korea’s constant provocations because of the impunity the alliance affords North Korea. 
Due to this complex and tangled dynamic, tension between China and the United States 
has recently built up to a serious level.  
However, on February 23rd 2016, the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and 
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met in Washington D.C. and agreed upon a resolution 
for tougher sanctions against North Korea.268 After having seven weeks of intense 
discussion, the United States and China agreed to cooperate together rather than staying 
in bitter opposition. The agreement on the oil sanctions and THAAD deployment are yet 
to be compromised, but the meeting ended with meaningful results. The U.S. accepted 
China’s proposal to consider a dialogue about a peace treaty with North Korea, while 
China agreed not to export certain resources to North Korea and inspect North Korean 
cargo entering or leaving its ports for the banned items.269 Even though there are still 
more discussions to be had, China and the United States have begun to collaborate, 
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working toward a dialogue for negotiations. Although China and the United States have 
not directly discussed the North Korean refugee crisis yet, the hope is that this first step 
in cooperation may lead to negotiations that would grant NKEC the basic human rights of 




Even though the United States does not experience the North Korean refugee 
crisis at its border, it is still related to its national interest because of the complicated and 
entangled diplomatic relationships with North Korea, South Korea, and China.  
North Korea’s continuous provocations are a great concern for the United States, 
as they affect the United States’ regional strategic interests in the Far East region.  The 
unpredictable military conduct of North Korea not only threatens the United States’ allies, 
South Korea and Japan, but also it can destabilize the international security in the region, 
which even China opposes. The United States has been using various diplomatic tactics 
to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear programs. The United States has also 
condemned human rights violations in North Korea and China, and established an 
institution to exclusively monitor the North Korean human rights situation.  
The United States and South Korea are close allies, while the United States and 
North Korea technically have been still at war since the truce in 1953. The United States 
still has a keen strategic interest in the security of South Korea, with more than 37,000 
United States’ armed forces along with their families stationed in South Korea, and great 
investments in many economic and industrial sectors in South Korea. For these reasons, 
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despite its physical remoteness, the United States is deeply related to political and 
diplomatic issues in East Asia.  
Lastly, the United States and China, two powerful countries, have recently 
engaged in a tug-of-war on many issues due to their many different perspectives and 
interests. The North Korean human rights issue is one of them the United States and 
China face each other to negotiate and settle. Both countries are yet to narrow the gap of 
their extreme opposite views: the United States condemns China’s noncompliance of 
international laws and China insists on its sovereignty, criticizing the United States’ 
intervention. Most recent military provocations by North Korea, however, resulted in a 
dialogue between China and the United States for potential collaboration.  
 
  




Geopolitical Context of North Korean Refugee Crisis 
: Relationships Between Two Koreas and China 
Since China has been vocal about North Korean refugee issues, it is easy to focus 
solely on China. South Korea, however, has dealt with these issues even longer than 
China. South Korea is one of the countries most immediately affected by the influx of 
NKEC. The South Korean government, however, was not as bold about its policy toward 
the North Korean refugees, but rather it has used a reserved “Quiet Diplomacy” when it 
comes to refugee issues in China.270 Not that the South Korean government is indifferent 
about the issue, but it carries much more complex diplomatic burdens. Therefore, the 
South Korean government is in the tight spot between maintaining a favorable diplomatic 
relationship with China and protecting its citizens by confronting China. In this section, 
the author articulates the South Korean government’s stand on the North Korean refugee 
crisis, the diplomatic complexity of dealing with the issue, and the necessity of 
cooperating with international NGOs and neighboring countries.   
 
5.1.  South Korea’s Quiet Diplomacy and the North Korean Refugee Issue 
In 1997, the South Korean government enacted “The Protection of North Korean 
Defectors271 and Resettlement Support Act,”272 but this law was to provide benefits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 Kim, “중국	 내	 탈북자	 문제	 해결방안에	 대한	 연구  :	 독일과	 베트남의	 경험을	 중심으로 
[Problems and Solutions of the North Korean Asylum Seekers in China: Focusing on the Experiences of 
Germany and Vietnam, Translated by Jane H. Lee].” 
271	  Though	  the	  author	  tries	  to	  avoid	  using	  the	  term	  “defector,”	  because	  the	  thesis	  argues	  that	  the	  term	  
does	  not	  fully	  encompass	  North	  Korean	  escapees’	  situation	  in	  China,	  the	  word	  is	  retained	  in	  
quotation	  to	  accurately	  represent	  sources	  material.	  
Lee    117 
mainly to North Korean escapees who are settled in South Korea, not elsewhere. In the 
constitution of South Korea, it is clearly stated that North Koreans are also acknowledged 
as South Korean citizens.273 Despite what is written in the constitution, South Korea has 
been passive to solve the North Korean refugee crisis in China. South Korea does 
recognize North Koreans as citizens of the Republic of Korea (ROK), whereas China sees 
them as citizens of the Democratic People Republic of Korea (DPRK). The conflicting 
views of NKEC between these two countries make this issue difficult to solve. 
The South Korean government has abided by “Quiet Diplomacy,”274 which means it will 
not publically express its official position regarding North Korean refugee issues in China. 
The South Korean public has criticized its government for not having an appropriate 
policy of saving fellow NKEC.275 
 
5.2.  South Korea’s Passivity and Diplomatic Complexity  
It is not that South Korea has been violating its constitution; rather, the 
government does provide a significant amount of assistance to the North Koreans once 
they are in South Korea. However, if the issue is an international conflict, meaning more 
than one country is involved, it is difficult for the government to actively take an action 
to solve the situation. If the government does so, it might cause a diplomatic conflict 
among countries. In particular, a conflict with China might severely affect South Korea’s 
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economy since China is one of its major trade partners. Due to intertwined diplomacy and 
interest concerns, the South Korean government evades any kind of affair that can 
possibly provoke China.276  
 
5.3.  The Necessity of Cooperation between South Korea and International NGOs  
 Given that the South Korean government is in this difficult predicament, 
collaborating with various non-government organizations is an effective way to share its 
burden. Contrary to the government, NGOs do not have any restrictions or diplomatic 
concerns to consider.277 NGOs, therefore, have broader boundaries and fewer restrictions 
to determine how they can help, alongside the governments. Even today, domestic and 
international NGOs are the ones who actively work in the field to help North Korean 
refugees and collect useful firsthand data.278 However, NGOs have adversities, such as a 
shortage of financial support and lack of authority to protect them from potential 
punishment by law enforcement. NGOs’ helping North Koreans in Chinese territory is 
illegal, and if the action is caught by the Chinese government, NGOs themselves do not 
have any authority to negotiate with the Chinese government for an exemption.279 In 
order to let NGOs do the work that the government cannot do, the government could 
support them directly and indirectly with a substantial amount of financial aid and 
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guarantee their protection from potential risk by having favorable diplomatic 
relationships with neighboring countries, especially China. Governments and NGOs have 
different boundaries that determine their roles, so that each has a different task to perform. 
If these two entities cooperate, solving the refugee crisis in China will be much more 
efficient. In this case, two heads are better than one.280  
 
5.4.  The Necessity of Cooperating with International Institutions and Allying with 
Neighboring Countries   
China has been reluctant to discuss human rights affairs. Therefore, it is critical to 
approach China cautiously in terms of the refugee problem. Rash action would negatively 
affect South Korea’s diplomatic relationship with China and cut off dialogue. In order to 
prevent this risk, utilizing a multilateral conference would be effective.281 To make this 
multilateral talk feasible, one option the South Korean government could do is to raise 
the North Korean refugee issue to international institutions, such as the United Nations 
and ask for their cooperation.  
Not only is the help from international institutions necessary, the help from 
neighboring countries is essential. Having more direct, detailed, and legally binding 
treaties with neighboring countries will prevent one country from risking its diplomatic 
relationship with China, but it will also lessen the burden. Countries directly and 
indirectly affected by the North Korean refugee crisis such as South Korea, China, Russia, 
Japan, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and more can come up 
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with an agreement that matches well to the particular culture of southeast Asia by 
establishing southeast Asian refugee treaties. Although Europe nowadays is struggling 
with distributing refugees among the EU members, having their own agreement helps 
them to communicate and cooperate effectively.282 Asia, too, could establish legally 
binding agreements to encourage countries to abide by international treaties.283  
This regional cooperation has proven to be effective in history. In the 1970s, 
many Vietnamese refugees fled to other countries in order to run away from the bloody 
war. Neighboring countries immediately came together to discuss the Vietnamese refugee 
exodus. They cooperatively distributed refugees and let them stay in each country until 
the situation in Vietnam settled down.284 Once the war ended, each country, with help 
from UNHCR, helped the Vietnamese refugees to go back to their home country. The 
South Korean government can also apply this case study in order to deal with the 
problem of excessive refugee population increase and the potential social disorder caused 
by NKEC seeking refuge.  
The possibility of economic, political and sociological burden on China is one of 
the main reasons for China’s deportation of North Korean refugees. However, by sharing 
the burden with neighboring countries, China would not have to take all the responsibility. 
In addition, financial aid should also be considered. As seen in the case of Vietnam, it 
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would be ideal for the other countries to encourage North Koreans to go back to their 
motherland once the situation is all settled. Establishing temporary residences or refugee 
camps in each of these countries might require an immense sum of money.285 If the 
consignment countries have to pay this cost, they would not want to receive refugees. 
However, by having a strong southeast regional agreement, which contains numerous 
leading economic countries, it would be easier to ask for the financial assistance from 
Western countries. To make this collaboration attainable, the role of the South Korean 
government should become more significant.286 
Not only does the government have to establish a favorable diplomatic 
relationship with China, but it also has to reach out to other neighboring countries and 
form alliances with them. Contrary to its long-lasting custom of deportation to North 
Korea, there have been some exceptional cases when the Chinese government did allow 
some North Koreans to go to South Korea. During President Myung-bak Lee’s 
administration of South Korea, China let some North Koreans flee to South Korea before 
the president’s official visit to China.287 Since such an act was an exceptional case, public 
discourse was heated to figure out what China’s intentions were, and the discussion came 
to the conclusion that China had been pressured by international criticism of its human 
rights violations regarding North Koreans. China wanted to prove that it is not as bad as 
its fellow members of the international community think. Whenever the issue receives 
international attention, China occasionally takes humanitarian actions and lets NKEC flee 
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to other countries according to their will.288 These exceptional yet hopeful cases 
demonstrate that if countries work cooperatively in one accord to persuade China, they 
can make a difference.289  
 
5.5.  Summary 
In order to prevent diplomatic conflicts with China, South Korea has been 
keeping a low profile regarding the North Korean refugee issue in China. However, the 
“Quiet Diplomacy” has not been effective. It neither improved the living situation of 
NKEC nor stopped the human rights violations. Rather than passively react to what China 
has done, the South Korean government should take initiative to propose a new dialogue 
to eradicate ongoing and potential human rights violations to its citizens. Moreover, due 
to the better access to the information, the South Korean public is more attentive to North 
Korean issues than ever before. Whenever there is news about the refugee crisis in China, 
the enraged South Korean public and various human rights activists demand the 
government to take active countermeasures. The public’s pressure on the government 
compels it to discard its long standing “Quiet Diplomacy.”  
 It is important for the South Korean government to perform its obligation to 
protect its citizens, North Koreans. The South Korean government’s selective actions 
based on diplomatic and power relations with concerned countries are against its own 
constitution. As written in the constitution, all citizens should be treated equally, and the 
South Korean government should go the extra mile to secure its citizens who are in 
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danger of severe human rights abuses. Rather than pursuing “Quiet Diplomacy,” the 
South Korean government could be more active and persuade the Chinese government to 
recognize NKEC as refugees or at least provide humanitarian assistance and stop 
deportation through diplomatic discussion.  
The South Korean government could also broaden the scope of communication so 
it can cooperate with China.290 Rather than expecting China to immediately reform the 
North Korea policy, the South Korean government could build a strong and constructive 
relationship with China in various aspects. Pushing China to a defensive side would not 
help, but exercising South Korea’s soft power would increase the possibility for China to 
engage in collaborative dialogue with South Korea. South Korea has had a close 
relationship with China in terms of economy, but South Korea could also broaden the 
relationship in cultural aspects. While approaching China in a more communal way, 
respecting China’s space and time can help South Korea create an even closer 
relationship with China. Recently, China clearly expressed its disagreement with and 
opposition to North Korea’s provocative military practices. North Korea’s surprise 
offensive moves put China in a difficult position since it’s the only ally of the country. It 
is likely the benefits that China is earning from North Korea weigh less than the cost it 
has to endure. This shifting dynamic is the golden opportunity for the South Korean 
government to establish a firm and favorable diplomatic relationship that will possibly 
lead to North Korean refugee reformation in China.  
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Geopolitical Context of North Korean Refugee Crisis 
: The Chinese Government’s Position on the North Korean Refugee Crisis 
 
In previous sections, the author explained China’s violations of international 
refugee laws and responsibility to abide by those laws. Before coming to a conclusion 
regarding China’s actions, it is essential to understand why China remains North Korea’s 
only ally despite international criticism and China’s intention behind it. Therefore, in this 
section, the author will introduce: the relationship between China-North Korea, the 
reasons why China retains this fragile relationship, China’s new responsibility as a 
growing superpower, and lastly the Chinese government’s stand regarding the North 
Korean refugee crisis.  
In this chapter, the author discusses the Ki-hyun Lee’s work291 extensively. Lee’s 
analysis and interpretation are not quite biased towards the western perspective and are 
crucial to understanding why China is not willing to recognize North Korean escapees 
as refugees. The author adopts Lee’s interpretation throughout the thesis, and his 
observation is cited frequently in this chapter. 
 
6.1. North Korea’s Dependent Relationship with China 
Today, China is the only ally of North Korea. Even after North Korea’s food 
distribution system had been halted, China’s support is the main reason that North Korea 
has survived today. China has not only affected North Korea’s economy, but it also plays 
a critical role in its survival. China deeply embedded its mining and resource extraction 
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businesses in North Korea and has been expanding its scope, gaining valuable natural 
resources in return for financial support. Energy, food, and consumer goods, including 
luxuries for the elite class, are all imported from China. The usage of the Yuan (Chinese 
currency) is prevailing in North Korea over the dollar.292 China’s vast material support is 
apparent in the capital city of North Korea, Pyongyang. Unlike different provinces, 
Pyongyang is an extremely exclusive city where only the elite can live. For example, 
high-end foreign automobiles, luxurious buildings, and expensive restaurants are frequent 
in the city. The life of Pyongyang citizens cannot be sustained without China’s financial 
and material support.293  
Even though China and North Korea have remained allies for more than half a 
century, their diplomatic relationship is not quite equal. It seems like North Korea is the 
only benefiting side, whereas China does not gain as much. On top of North Korea not 
providing China with a substantial amount of benefit, China’s relationship with North 
Korea also causes China to lose favor with other international committees whenever 
North Korea provokes the world by carrying out nuclear tests. Despite China’s seemingly 
short end of the deal, China has maintained an alliance with North Korea by using 
conciliatory policy. Contrary to China’s appeasing policy, North Korea has not 
corresponded with what China has expected.  
North Korea continued to provoke China and other countries by attacking the South 
Korean vessel Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island in 2010.294 Before conducting such 
attacks, North Korea did not give prior notice to China. These surprising attacks are still 
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ongoing today. North Korea tested its newly developed hydrogen bomb and missile in 
2016. Moreover, the recent purge of pro-China politician Sung-teak Jang in 2013 blocked 
communication channels between China and North Korea. Mr. Jang and his men were 
cooperative with China, but ever since North Korea took a hardline policy in 2011, along 
with a regime change, the relationship between the two countries has crumbled.295 
 
6.2. Why has this Fragile Relationship Lasted this Long? 
From an outsider’s perspective, it may seem irrational to sustain an alliance in 
which one side (North Korea) is gaining and the other side (China) is losing. The author 
already explained China’s intention and motive in Chapter 2, but since this is a crucial 
concept to be aware of in order to understand the relationship between China and North 
Korea, the author will briefly review the points.  
 
6.2.A. China’s Containment Plan Against the United States 
China wants North Korea to maintain its status quo and prevent it from collapsing. 
China is concerned about the United States coming right up to its border, absorbing its 
buffer zone—North Korea—and placing it under US influence.296 China predicts that 
power shifts between it and the United States would trigger the United States to broaden 
its influence to East Asia in order to stop China from growing.297 Since the power of the 
United States is relatively declining, whereas China is growing at an unprecedented speed, 
China believes that the United States is eager to build strong alliances with East Asian 
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countries in order to isolate China from its neighboring states.298 As a result of these 
phenomena, China embraces North Korea as a way to balance the power structure against 
the United States. By building as many allies as possible and keeping North Korea as a 
geostrategic region, China plans to block the United States’ influence from coming 
directly into China.299  
 
6.2.B. Maintaining North Korea’s Stability for China’s Economic Development 
Ever since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reformation, China has been putting its 
effort into building up a strong market-oriented economy. For this reason, China wants to 
focus solely on its economic development and does not want to be involved in 
neighboring countries’ conflicts that might halt its economic development.300 China 
predicts that once North Korea collapses or if conflict occurs between North and South 
Korea, China has to inevitably become involved and pay the vast amount of expenses in 
the process of confrontation and reconstruction. China does not want its rapidly growing 
economy to be interrupted by external conflicts. Maintaining North Korea as it is now is 
China’s reason for preventing war or the fall of North Korea.  
 
6.2.C. Preventing Social Disorder in China 
China believes that acknowledging North Koreans as refugees will trigger a mass 
influx of NKEC from North Korea. Today even without giving NKEC legal status, there 
are already social disorders involving NKEC, such as human trafficking, robbery, 
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unemployment, and so on. China would not want these social problems to be amplified. 
Moreover, China is unwilling to pay probationary expenses, which might also negatively 
affect its fast growing economic development.301  
 
6.2.D. China’s Dilemma Regarding Human Rights Issues 
China could not speak about North Korea’s human rights violation because China 
also has been targeted when it comes to abusing the human rights of minorities. 
International human rights advocates have criticized China for its inhumane treatment of 
minorities. If China acknowledges North Koreans as refugees and provides humanitarian 
assistance to them, minorities such as Tibetans and Uighurs would trigger social riots, 
demanding better treatment and their independence.302 Moreover, China is afraid of 
chaotic situations in border areas where myriads of ethnic Koreans are residing. Since 
ethnic Koreans share cultural and national commonalities with North Koreans, they might 
ally with NKEC and gain power and arise, demanding independence from China as well. 
China believes one small exception can trigger uncontrollable chaotic social disorder, so 
no exception shall be allowed.   
 
6.3. China’s Changing Attitude Towards North Korea 
China’s modernist camp sees North Korea as a permanent nuisance and an 
embarrassment. The camp thinks the remaining alliance with North Korea is a bigger loss 
than a gain. They see that previously North Korea may have been a geostrategic asset for 
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China, but it no longer plays an important role.303 Currently, North Korea’s provoking 
attacks are rather disturbing to China’s international image and are negatively affecting 
China’s interests. They see China as being exploited by North Korea, giving economic 
and political support almost unconditionally. The modernist camps argue that the world 
has changed significantly, therefore, China should get rid of no-longer-profitable North 
Korea, and adhere to what the international community is suggesting.304  
Contrary to the deteriorated relationship with North Korea, China has been 
developing a friendly relationship with South Korea. Enduring harsh criticism from North 
Korea, who condemns China as a betrayer, China established a firm diplomatic 
relationship with South Korea, consolidating their alliance by enhancing their economic 
relationship.305 Their partnership greatly benefited both sides. In 2015, China became 
South Korea’s number one trade partner.306 In addition, current president Geun-hye Park 
was recently invited to China and received with great enthusiasm, whereas the leader of 
North Korea, Jeong-un Kim has not even been invited.307  
 
6.4. China’s Different Interpretation of Human Rights 
On the grounds of human rights violations, international community has been 
pressuring North Korea and China. However, China has remained immovable against 
international community’s pressuring on the North Korea issues. China is in the dilemma 
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between acquitting its responsibility as a global leader and holding onto its national 
interests by supporting North Korea. The North Korean refugee issue is directly related to 
China’s nonnegotiable interest. China argues that the requests from developed countries 
and responsibilities that have been put on China are too excessive. Some camps of 
Chinese elites are reluctant to establish G2 or Chimerica relationships because China 
does not have an obligation to follow Western-made international regulations.308  
 The reason why China is pursuing this stand is, of course, related to the 
geostrategic importance of North Korea for China, but another factor is that China has a 
different interpretation of human rights. China has been asserting its distinctive 
interpretation of human rights, differentiating itself from that of the Western 
interpretation. International human rights are not a standalone foreign policy issue for 
China.309 Human rights are entangled with numerous national core interests, “which 
include ensuring favorable international conditions for its economic growth, preservation 
of its political system and social stability, and defense of its territorial integrity.”310 
Based on this argument, it appears that the Chinese leadership prioritizes maximizing 
national profit over human rights, rather than viewing human rights as inalienable and 
fully guaranteeing safety for its people.311 China is prioritizing its sovereignty over 
human rights and putting socioeconomic policy before people’s political rights.312 China 
sees ‘survival’ as the core of human rights, and in order to guarantee its citizens’ survival, 
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economic development is the key.313 Therefore, it is inevitable that the government will 
sometimes overlook individuals’ rights for the greater good, economic development. 
 Moreover, China believes the importance and the concept of human rights varies 
according to each country’s cultural, historical, sociological, and economic background, 
so it might not be fair to force China to adopt the Western standard of human rights. 
China emphasized that forcing it to follow the Western human rights regulations is an 
interference of internal affairs.314 According to the logic that China has been insisting on, 
international community should not pressure China to recognize NKEC as refugees.315  
 Although human rights policies do not appear to be one of China’s primary 
concerns, they are important priority issues for Western states. Out of fear of China’s 
non-cooperation, despite its massive influence as a rapidly growing superpower, the 
Western states harshly criticize China for its disappointing responses. Even though 
Beijing resists this criticism, some Chinese officials in charge of foreign policy recognize 
that disputes over human rights issues are “damaging the country’s global image at a time 
when it is seeking to reassure the world that there is nothing to fear from its ‘peaceful 
development’”316 The Western states remain strongly committed to the international 
human rights system, because they view it as a source of “moral legitimacy for the post-
Second World War liberal international order that they are seeking to protect in the 
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transition to a multipolar world.”317 This idea is not only shared by Western states but by 
other “developing and developed countries.”  
 
6.5. China’s Non-Intervention Policy 
The Chinese government has a tendency of placing socio-economic rights and the 
rights to development before individual rights, insisting that the exercise of individual 
rights could be altered based on the conditions of a country. Whenever China is criticized 
for its undervaluing of its citizens’ individual rights, China steels itself against public 
censure by insisting on its sovereignty and non-interference, which makes other UN 
member states less willing to challenge China. As Chatham House observes, “China has 
participated in the international human rights system for over three decades but close 
scrutiny of its role has been limited, especially in more recent years.” As demonstrated 
throughout this thesis, the UN has constantly criticized China for its non-cooperation and 
resistance to UN’s careful investigation within China about its human rights conditions. 
However, China blocked UN members from investigating its abuses of human rights by 
obscuring information and hindering access. China rebuked public censure, claiming that 
excessive investigation is an infringement of its sovereignty. China’s commitment to non-
interference causes the international community to question China’s responsibility as a 
global power. Rather than cooperating with the international community, China has 
resisted the UN’s “interference on human rights grounds in its internal affairs.” For 
example, as seen in “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United 
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Nations Reform,” published on June 7th 2005, “Internal unrest in a country is often 
caused by complex factors…No reckless intervention should be allowed.” 
Within China as well, debate has been growing between the traditional party and 
the modern party. On the one hand, the traditional party holds on to non-interference in 
order to reinforce international economic and strategic interest. While on the other hand, 
the modern party insists on more impactful foreign policies to match China’s growth as 
an international superpower. Particularly, Chinese foreign policy and international legal 
communities have insisted China abandon its traditional custom of non-interference 
policy, and instead demonstrate a more approachable and responsible image as a growing 
power. Since the 2010 Olympics held in Shanghai, this voice has been prevailing within 
civilians as well. Following the Olympic games, China showed its cutting-edged 
technologies and manifested its financial success worldwide. The idea of abolishing 
China’s non-intervention policy has been raised to meet the corresponding image of a 
global leader, not only in economic fields but also in different arenas. According to the 
Chatham House report, Chinese analysts predicted that China’s long-standing non-
intervention policy would inevitably change, “as its increasingly complex investments 

















It is not true that China does not feel responsible for the North Korean refugee 
crisis, rather China is acutely conscious about the possible deterioration of the diplomatic 
relationship with the United States and South Korea. China would want to maintain a 
favorable relationship with both South Korea and North Korea, stabilizing the region. 
North Korea, however, is constantly provoking South Korea, the United States, and Japan, 
which are the three major trade partners of China. This dilemma keeps pushing China in a 
difficult position where it has to choose either its responsibility or its profit.318  
 It is crucial for the international community to understand China’s problematic 
situation. Rather than solely condemning China for its irresponsible conduct, the 
international community could collaborate to find a solution. Every state prioritizes its 
national interest in diplomacy. However, there has to be a clear line where the state can 
insist on its sovereignty. The dignity of humanity is a universal concept. It is not 
justifiable to neglect a universal concept under any circumstances. Therefore, China 
using sovereignty and different interpretation excuses in order to justify its human rights 
violations is not acceptable. It could be problematic if the international community 
unilaterally demands China’s compliance, and China shirks its responsibility, insisting on 
its distorted interpretation of a universal concept. Profound understanding of the other 
side’s intentions and actively finding common ground is one way to stop the human 
rights abuse against North Koreans.        
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis discusses the following five topics: (1) the Chinese government’s 
obligations of protecting NKEC based on international human rights laws; (2) the 
international community’s suggestions for China to adopt broader interpretation of the 
international refugee laws for NKEC; (3) China’s new responsibilities as a new global 
leader; (4) the complexity of universal values such as human rights when they are 
intertwined with political and diplomatic issues; and lastly, (5) need for cooperation from 
the international community to convince China to comply with the broader international 
refugee standards and provide necessary support.  
International institutions such as the United Nations emphasize the 
responsibilities of nations in complying with universal values. For this reason, they have 
criticized China for neglecting its duties. China, however, has numerous national interests 
factors got entangled with human rights issues, and it causes apparent noncompliance 
with the international human rights treaties. Until recently, China has prioritized 
stabilizing North Korea for national benefits over complying with international order and 
regulations as its responsibility. This decision is reflected in their domestic policy in 
treating NKEC. Although China is aware of its responsibility in observing human rights 
protection as a leading nation, it is not easy for China to give up one of its crucial 
strategic interests that might significantly affect its domestic security concerns. This is 
why China intentionally treats NKEC as illegal migrants, instead of refugees. Since 
NKEC are viewed as economic migrants, China asserts that their refoulement action is 
justifiable, and international community’s demands interfere with its sovereignty. China’s 
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noncompliance is not a matter of unawareness of international standards. Hence, the 
international community’s criticism and pressure are not always efficient and effective.  
As explained in chapter 4, in the aspect of China’s future diplomatic relationship 
with the Western nations, particularly the United States, it is beneficial for China in the 
long run to cooperate with the international community in human rights issues. China is 
likely aware of the long-term benefits it will receive. China cannot comply with this 
expectation immediately, however, due to its complicated relationship with North Korea. 
China has so many internal and external factors that hinder it from collaborating with 
international community in human rights issues: North Korea’s geostrategic role as a 
buffer zone for national security, China’s vulnerability regarding human rights issues, 
and potential social disorder caused by NKEC. If the international community expects 
China to be more responsible as a global leader, instead of condemning China and 
demand it to bear this burden alone, they should rather try to find a way to solve the 
North Korean refugee problem together. It is important to understand China’s intention of 
stabilizing neighboring countries to maintain its rapidly growing economic development 
and also its especially difficult situation of being the sole ally of one of the most isolated 
countries, North Korea. Because of China’s complex relationship with North Korea, the 
international community should understand the rationale of China’s support of North 
Korea. After assessing China’s situation, international institutions, NGOs, and 
neighboring countries such as South Korea should collaborate with China by setting a 
friendlier environment and providing financial support for establishing temporary 
residence for refugees to China, for example. China can learn from other countries, such 
as Germany, Vietnam and Syria, by seeking their information and advice. Korea has a 
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similar background to Germany, which experienced separation and unification between 
East and West Germany. Not only North and South Korea but also China could learn 
from Germany’s example. Although the refugee situations in Vietnam and Syria do not 
perfectly resemble North Korea’s refugee crisis, both countries have previously dealt 
with and are dealing with refugee crises. They could offer insightful advice regarding 
cooperating with neighboring countries and dealing with massive numbers of refugees.  
By joining hands with the international community and NGOs, China could share its 
burden with other countries. In order to attract China to follow the international standards, 
collective effort is essential and each member state of the international community should 
cooperate to encourage China to be more responsible. Holding fast to one’s views 
without finding room for compromise leads continuing conflicts with one another.  
On the part of China, besides depending on external assistance, China should 
show its willingness to actively put its earnest effort to solve North Korean refugee crisis 
as a global leader. Distorting the interpretation of universal values such as human rights 
by arguing that the human rights issues may compromise its sovereignty, and violating 
the international laws for the sake of imminent economic benefits would not yield the 
long-term benefits for China. Its myopic decision would likely damage its credibility and 
its international image, which may ultimately cause deterioration of diplomatic 
relationships with other countries. If China at least shows its earnest effort to resolve the 
human rights problems and assume its responsibilities as a global leader, it will gain 
support from many countries.  
Lastly, the author wants to alert the readers that the refugee issue is not 
necessarily a remote issue that happens in distant time and is limited to the third world 
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countries’ predicaments. In this fast-changing and unpredictable world, perhaps none of 
us are safe from war, terror and even from natural disasters. Anyone can become stateless 
at anytime. Globalization has transformed a regional issue to a transnational issue. Once 
there is a massive refugee influx in neighboring countries, it is no longer “their” problem, 
but it can be “our” problem, as seen in the North Korean and Syrian refugee crisis. 
Nobody was born to be a refugee, and no one should be deprived of the basic human right 
to gain a refugee status. For this reason, we all should be keenly aware of refugee crises 
abroad, and thoroughly think about how the world as a whole should deal with refugee 
crises cooperatively. The author would like to invite the readers to consider three serious 
questions about the human rights and refugees issue:  First, how do we determine if a 
case may be exceptional enough to apply different interpretations of universal human 
rights values? Second, to what extent should the exceptions or different interpretations be 
acceptable and be allowed? And finally, where is the clear line between protecting 
universal values and compromising national sovereignty?  
The author believes that despite China’s complicated and dilemmatic situation, 
China still has to comply with the treaties. China’s national interests should not be traded 
off with millions of North Korean people’s lives. China shall find a new way to stop its 
infringement upon North Korean’s rights through cooperation with international 
community. The NKEC have the same basic human rights to be respected and protected 
as any other human being. It would be unjust to let them risk their lives only to pursue 
those entitled human rights due to other nations’ interest issues and peoples’ ignorance. 
The author sincerely hopes this thesis speaks on behalf of many voiceless NKEC and 
enlightens readers to understand deplorable situations that NKEC have to endure. It is 
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time that we all should listen to their voice and let them receive the basic human rights 
they deserve.   
 





Evolution of Perspectives about North Korea by the United States and South 
Korean Government During the Past Few Decades 
 
It seems like that the United States is having difficulty in negotiating with North 
Korea. Given that the North Korea’s extremely isolated condition, it is hard for the 
United States to predict North Korea’s intention of potential provocations and persuade 
North Korea to cooperate with international community. On top of North Korea’s 
unpredictability, the United States’ inconsistency of diplomatic approaches toward North 
Korea during the different United States’ administration periods, make the relationship 
between the United States and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK: North 
Korea) deteriorated overtime. In the following section, the characteristics of power 
strategies following the transitions of past and current US- the Republic of Korea (ROK: 
South Korea) administrations are analyzed, as an example, and what consequences each 
power strategy has caused to DPRK is demonstrated.  
 
! Clinton Administration & Kim Dae Jung Administration 
Out of all the United States administrations in the last fifty years, the Clinton 
Administration has made the greatest improvement in creating an open dialogue with 
North Korea. In 1994, Clinton made the “US-North Korea Agreed Framework” to 
normalize the political and economic relationship with North Korea.319 On the condition 
that North Korea freezes its further processing of the plutonium fuel rods that may lead to 
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a production of nuclear weapons, the United States agreed to build light water reactor 
plants by 2003. Along with Clinton, South Korea’s President Kim Dae Jung, who won 
the Nobel Peace prize through his peaceful Inter-Korea policy, practiced the “Sunshine 
Policy” for promoting dialogue with North Korea.320 Kim worked cooperatively with the 
Clinton administration and actively engaged with North Korea. However, both the United 
States and ROK yielded to despair when they found out that DPRK was secretly 
proceeding with its nuclear weapon production. Both Clinton and Kim were discouraged 
by North Korea’s breach of promise, but did continue to keep a continuous ‘dialogue-
and-engagement.’ 
Regardless of Clinton’s consistent usage of soft power, it failed to maintain its 
legitimacy after the September 11 incident in the United States. The United States 
immediately changed its diplomacy tactic from soft power to hard power. The United 
States’ sudden change in foreign policy not only led its national security to become 
vulnerable but also made its international image unattractive. 
 
! Bush Administration & Roh Moo Hyun Administration 
The culmination of conflicts between the United States and two Koreas happened 
during the Bush Administration. All three countries had confronting ideas and strategies 
toward one another. The Bush Administration’s diplomatic skill was drastically in 
opposition to Clinton’s. Whereas the Clinton administration kept an open dialogue 
between the United States and North Korea, even if North Korea breached a treaty, the 
Bush administration was hostile. According to Victor Cha, during his first term, Bush 
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was unwilling to engage North Korea, but during his second term, Bush aggressively 
engaged in “tough talk” and enraged North Korea by conducting adversarial sanctions on 
it.321 But North Korea was not the only one that conflicted with the Bush Administration. 
Because South Korea’s President Roh Moo Hyun actively tried to work with DPRK 
following up on the previous administration’s “Sunshine policy,” Bush and Roh faced 
sharp disagreement on diplomacy with DPRK. Two strong allies were deeply divided. 
DPRK’s regime, which had maintained the same administration for over a half-century, 
became irritated by this inconsistency, creating further strife between the two countries.  
Before the Bush administration took over, North Korea somewhat displayed 
cooperative attitude of making progress by refraining from conducting missile tests and 
keeping an open dialogue with the United States and South Korea. However, soon after 
the United States showed its iron fist to North Korea, it also reacted aggressively, 
resuming long-range missile tests and declining to appear at the Six Party talks.322 
Depending solely on hard power can produce highly unpredicted and unwanted responses 
from the enforcer’s counterpart.  
 
! Obama Administration & Lee Myung Bak Administration 
The Obama Administration and combination of Lee Myung Bak’s “Inter-Korea 
Relations” was very fickle.323 Revere analyzes that, at first, Obama followed Clinton’s 
engaging, soft-power diplomatic strategy.324 Despite the Obama administration’s 
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reconciliation approach, ROK’s new president Lee Myung Bak chose the opposite route, 
somewhat similar to that of Bush’s, thus the United States and ROK again did not get 
along as strong allies. North Korea was frustrated by this discrepancy and continued to 
not care about how the other parties reacted and refused to participate in the Six Party 
talks, and continued to conduct its long-range rockets and missiles tests.325 The Obama 
administration counteracted this by imposing tough sanctions on North Korea. However, 
on February 2012, Obama created the “Leap Day Agreement” to provide North Korea 
with food aid on the condition that North Korea froze its missile and nuclear weapon 
tests, a program similar to Clinton’s reward and incentives policy.326 However, this 
peaceful agreement failed within two months when North Korea conducted another 
missile test. Predictably, Obama stopped the United States’ dialogue with North Korea, 
and furthermore, President Lee also cut off the active supply of aids to North Korea. The 
Lee’s Inter-Korea Relations wholly destroyed the long-built credibility between ROK and 
DPRK in short period of time.  
As we have seen, each administration of ROK and the United States has had 
different diplomatic approaches, using various power tactics that made it extremely hard 
for DPRK to respond accordingly. However, the one thing remains the same amongst all 
US administrations, regardless of the type of diplomatic strategies it chooses, is that 
every administration has pursued the same goal of denuclearization of DPRK. This may 
be a rational goal to preserve world peace, but in DPRK’s perspective, this is an unfair 
demand. Denuclearization can adversely affect the stability of the Kim’s regime and thus 
DPRK is unwilling to participate in all kinds of negotiations. Especially in a country 
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where its dictatorship has been passed down for generations, it is unlikely that the North 
Korean regime is going to surrender its power and dismantle the most effective tool to 
maintain its regime: nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is almost impossible to urge North 
Korea to denuclearize, as it would imply yielding its own sovereignty, unless there is a 
worthwhile incentive to counter their existential concern. After seeing Libya and 
Romania’s collapses, Kim’s regime cut off his country from the outside world in order to 
hold onto their dictatorship. If the United States keeps its sanction and maintains its hard 
power diplomacy, the situation will never get better but deteriorate. 
It is not surprising that the United States is tired of the stop-and-go diplomacy act 
with North Korea. The United States’ foreign affairs officials might be frustrated by 
North Korea’s violation of its treaties with the United States when it has been doing 
everything in its power to keep a dialogue with North Korea. Despite the limited 
understanding of complicated diplomatic conflicts, it is cautiously assumed that the 
reason why the United States has constantly suffered from inconsistent diplomatic 
communication with North Korea is because the United States has put so much effort in 
“denuclearizing” and “disarming” the country. However, the United States has yet to find 
a common ground in which North Korea is willing to negotiate. Instead of pushing North 
Korea into a dead end, the United States could readjust its diplomatic approach. Not that 
the United States should recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapon state, but slowing 
down its sanction actions while constantly set a friendly environment to set up dialogue 
with North Korea will improve its attempts to take comprehensive diplomatic approaches. 
Harsh sanctions alone will not help to build a better US-North Korea relationship, as 
North Korea has survived the extreme hardship over half a century without substantial 
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outside supplies and trade. Instead, the United States should understand the true 
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